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USING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONDEAT 
SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE TO ASSIGN 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORKER STATUTORY 
BENEFITS AND PROTECTIONS 
MICHAEL C. HARPER* 
ABSTRACT 
When viewed flexibly, not to find doctrinal rules, but rather to find 
insight from judges’ collective judgment on social values, the common law 
may have particular value for modern policy makers. For instance, a 
common law insight could set policy makers in both the United States 
(U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) on a promising path for defining 
when workers are to be protected and benefitted by employment statutes. 
That insight reflects the underlying rationale for the common law that 
made relevant the initial distinction between employees and independent 
contractors - the common law of vicarious liability through respondeat 
superior. This rationale is based on the appropriateness of cost 
internalization where there is an alignment of worker duties with employer 
interests. It presents a socially compelling reason for assigning 
responsibility for workers’ benefits and protections to an employing entity, 
or entities, with aligned interests, rather than to the workers or to the 
general society.  
While statutory protections and benefits should be based on worker 
need, the alignment of worker duties with employer interests provides a 
critical principle of economic fairness for assigning responsibility for the 
protections and benefits. Where workers do not have sufficient control 
over economic resources to work in their own independent interests, 
rather than in line with those of some employer or employers, they are in a 
position of greater need than those workers who do have such control. 
Furthermore, in the absence of such resource control, their duties will be 
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aligned with the interests of employers that presumptively should be 
responsible for the protections and benefits offered by modern employment 
statutes. This essay elaborates how the principle, which is expressed in the 
Restatement of Employment Law, applies to some difficult questions in the 
modern economy, including the treatment of workers employed by digital 
platforms and those with multiple potential employers.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/7
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INTRODUCTION 
The common law remains an intellectual battle ground in Anglo-
American legal systems, even in the current age of statutes. This is true in 
significant part because the common law provides legitimacy for 
arguments actually based on policy, ideology, and interest. It also is true 
because of the common law’s malleability and related susceptibility to 
significantly varied interpretations. 
Mere contention over the meaning of the common law to provide 
legitimacy for modern statutes is usually not productive of sensible policy, 
however. It generally produces no more than reified doctrine unsuited for 
problems the common law was not framed to solve. Yet, when viewed 
more flexibly, not to find doctrinal rules, but rather to find insight from 
judges’ collective judgment on social values, examining the common law 
may have a different kind of value for modern policy makers. 
Both the misuse and the value of the common law are illustrated by the 
attempts to define when workers are to be protected and benefitted by 
employment statutes in both the United States (U.S.) and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), nations that proudly share a common law tradition.1 The 
misuse is evident as the courts of each nation have looked to the common 
law to provide legitimacy for formulaic definitions that serve to set 
presumptive boundaries on those protected by their employment statutes. 
The courts of each have struggled both to make those boundaries clear and 
predictable, and also to provide a compelling and coherent rationale for the 
boundaries they have traced by common law formulas. American law has 
been burdened by multifactor tests that do not explicitly focus on some 
ultimate standard or principle, such as the need of workers for coverage by 
employment statutes.2 U.K. law has compounded this burden by doctrine 
derived from the common law of contracts without explaining a rationale 
related to the purposes of its employment laws, including the needs of its 
workers.3  
The result has been a halting and uncertain judicial response to the 
 
 
1  I use the word worker rather than employee to avoid the current legal associations of the 
latter. The word worker refers to those providing economic labor, whether or not recognized by the 
law currently or historically as employees. For a probing history of the evolution in Britain of the 
variant relationships now arguably classified as ones of employment, see generally SIMON DEAKIN & 
FRANK WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET: INDUSTRIALIZATION, EMPLOYMENT 
AND LEGAL EVOLUTION (Paul Davies et al. eds., 2005) (especially ch. 2). See also Simon Deakin, 
Does the Personal Employment Contract Provide a Basis for the Reunification of Employment Law?, 
36 INDUS. L. J. 68, 72-74 (2007). 
2  See infra text accompanying notes 14-35. 
3  See infra text accompanying notes 38-74. 
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challenge of defining the employment relationship in the shadow of two 
major developments in the modern workplace. The first is its vertical 
disintegration or fissuring, as the use of staffing agencies, subcontracting, 
and franchising, continues to proliferate. The second has been the 
emergence of a workforce who accepts work from digital platforms 
without a traditional contract of employment.   
Yet, judicial and legislative policy makers in each nation could be set 
on a much more promising path by setting a default presumption of 
coverage based on an underlying rationale relevant to the initial distinction 
between employees and independent contractors - the common law of 
vicarious liability through respondeat superior.4  This rationale is based on 
the appropriateness of cost internalization where there is an alignment of 
worker duties with employer interests. It presents a socially compelling 
reason for assigning responsibility for workers’ benefits and protections to 
an employing entity, or entities, with aligned interests, rather than to the 
workers or to the general society.5  
While statutory protections and benefits should be based on worker 
need, the alignment of worker duties with employer interests provides a 
critical principle of economic fairness for assigning responsibility for the 
protections and benefits. Where workers do not have sufficient control 
over economic resources to work in their own independent interests, rather 
than in line with those of some employer or employers, they are in a 
position of greater need than those workers who do have such control. 
Furthermore, in the absence of such resource control, their duties will be 
aligned with the interests of employers that presumptively should be 
responsible for the protections and benefits offered by modern 
employment statutes.   
This essay will explain how the common law of respondeat superior is 
based on a principle that also can determine the assignment of 
responsibility for benefits and protections set in modern employment 
statutes.6 In its first section, the essay briefly recounts the unfocused use of 
multifactor tests in the U.S. to set unclear and unconvincing default rules 
for the coverage of American employment statutes.7 In its second section, 
the essay also briefly describes how U.K. courts not only have failed to 
 
 
4  See infra text accompanying notes 75-101. 
5  See infra text accompanying notes 88-95. 
6  The essay does not advocate for any particular benefits or protections; it instead assumes the 
choice of benefits and protections is a separable policy question that can be and has been rationally 
answered in variant ways in the U.S. and the U.K.  
7  See infra text accompanying notes 14-35. 
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provide a more convincing default rule, but also have encumbered British 
law with unnecessary doctrine drawn from the common law of contracts.8  
The essay, in its third section, then explains how the common law of 
respondeat superior offers a principled basis for deciding both when, and 
to which employing entities, responsibility for the protections and benefits 
of modern laws should be assigned.9 The fourth section then elaborates 
how the principled basis for employer responsibility derived from 
respondeat superior law can be embraced by American courts, and British 
policy makers,10 by adopting the distinction between employees and 
independent contractors articulated in the recently published Restatement 
of Employment Law.11  
The remainder of the essay then elaborates how the principle, as 
expressed in the Restatement of Employment Law, would apply to some 
difficult questions in the modern economy. The fifth section considers 
how the principle meets the challenges posed by employers shifting the 
risks of economic activity on to vulnerable workers, including those in the 
new digital “gig” economy, whose duties remain aligned with the interests 
of the employers and whose need of protection and benefits remains as 
great as those of more traditional workers.12 The sixth section addresses 
assigning responsibility for certain workers’ statutory benefits and 
protections to multiple “fissured” employers whose interests are served by 
the workers.13 Finally, the seventh section considers several reasons that 
policy makers might wish to depart from the default rule derived from 
respondeat superior.14 
I. AMERICAN LAW 
Most federal American employment or labor statutes define coverage 
through a meaningless and typically circular definition of the employment 
relationship. For instance, many limit protection to those described as an 
“employee” and then define employee to be “any individual employed by 
 
 
8  See infra text accompanying notes 38-74. 
9  See infra text accompanying notes 75-101. 
10  See infra text accompanying notes 102-107. 
11  See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW (AM. LAW INST. 2015). I served as a Reporter with the 
primary responsibility for the drafting of the sections in this Restatement that define the employment 
relationship it covers. The positions expressed in this essay are my own and not to be associated with 
the ALI or any of its other members. 
12  See infra text accompanying notes 108-141. 
13  See infra text accompanying notes 142-204. 
14  See infra text accompanying notes 205-216. 
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an employer.”15 As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court for at least the past 
forty years has invoked the common law to provide legitimacy for its 
opinions concerning the scope of federal employment statutes that offer 
protection to employees but not to independent contractors.16 Earlier it had 
tried to use a more flexible approach, taking into account the purpose of a 
particular law, such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)17 
governing collective bargaining,18 but had been chastised by Congress for 
departing from the common law as a default definition for covered 
employees.19  
The Supreme Court’s more recent invocation of the common law may 
have provided some legitimacy, but it certainly has not provided clarity. 
The reason for this lack of clarity in the U.S. is not simply multiple state 
court jurisdictions with the authority to make their own common law, or a 
federal court system that since 1938 has been denied the authority to make 
general American federal common law not tied to the interpretation of 
statutes.20 It also is because the state court systems have not been able to 
develop a clear consensus on a definition of the employee relationship, 
even with the assistance of the efforts of the American Law Institute (ALI) 
to restate the best common law formulated in American jurisdictions.21  
It was not as if the ALI did not try to provide a meaningful definition, 
even before the recent Restatement of Employment Law. Agency law for 
purposes of setting the master’s vicarious or respondeat superior liability 
for the torts of servants required a definition of servant, and the 
 
 
15  See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018); Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2018); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111 (2018); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2018); Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2018); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, 29 U.S.C. § 652 (2018). 
16  See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
17  29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 
18 See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 126-128 (1944) (rejecting use of “common-law 
tests . . . without regard to the statute’s purposes”). 
19  See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 309 (1948). The Court 
subsequently followed the Congressional directive to use the common law in interpreting the NLRA. 
See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).  
20  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
21  The ALI was founded in 1923 to help clarify and simplify common law in America by the 
production of what are called Restatements of that law. The Restatements are to articulate in black 
letter with supporting illustrations and comments a wise synthesis of the sometimes variant positions 
taken by courts in the fifty state systems and in some cases by the federal system. See Herbert 
Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 AM. B. ASS’N J. 147, 149 (1969) (“In judging what was 
right, a preponderating balance of authority would normally be given weight, as it no doubt would 
generally weigh with courts, but it has not been thought to be conclusive.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:161 
 
 
 
 
 
Restatements of Agency have attempted to provide one, primarily through 
a right-to-control test.22  The mid-twentieth century Second Restatement of 
Agency, which remains the most influential, at least on this issue, defines 
servant as “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another 
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the 
services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”23 The Second 
Restatement of Agency recognized, however, that the decisions could not 
be fully captured by so simple a formulation. A “full-time cook,” “ship 
captains,” “managers of great corporations,” a “traveling salesman,” and 
“skilled artisans … with whose method of accomplishing results the so-
called master has neither the knowledge nor the desire to interfere,” all 
could be servants regardless of the attenuation of the master’s control or 
even right to control physical conduct.24  
The Second Restatement of Agency thus supplemented the right-to-
control test with a non-exclusive list of ten factors to determine “whether 
one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor.”25 It did 
not, however, specify whether these factors were to be used to expand the 
scope of employee status beyond that indicated by the right-to-control test 
or rather were to be used in service to this test. The former, however, 
seems suggested by inclusion, as the first of the ten listed factors, of “(a) 
the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise 
over the details of the work.”26 The Restatement Second of Agency 
 
 
22  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2005); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 
(AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
23  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). This language was 
almost identical to that of the Restatement (First). See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
24  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmts. a, e, and i (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
25  Id. at § 220(2). This subsection states that  
[In] determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the 
following matters of fact, among other, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the 
agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one 
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with 
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular 
occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, 
and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the 
person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) 
whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not 
the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the 
principal is or is not in business.  
Id. The Restatement (First) contained the same list, without the last factor. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF AGENCY § 220. 
26  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/7
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thereby presented judges with great discretion and lawyers with great 
uncertainty.27 
The Supreme Court has not provided more clarity with its formulation 
of a default definitional line between employees who are protected by 
federal statutes and independent contractors who are not. That 
formulation, which the Supreme Court purports to be based on the 
common law,28 includes consideration of “the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,” but 
also lists “[a]mong the other factors relevant to [the] inquiry” twelve other 
factors, including six that were at least similar to those in the Restatement 
Second list.29 The Court has not explained why it provided additional 
factors or declined to include others in the Restatement list. It has offered 
no guidance on the relative weight that is to be given to the factors, and 
has even declined to confirm a primary role for the right-to-control factor.  
It has stated only, and unhelpfully, that “[n]o one of these factors is 
determinative.”30  
Furthermore, in a case interpreting the circular definition of employee 
in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) the Court 
cited not only the Restatement Second, but also an Internal Revenue 
Service ruling that sets forth “20 factors as guides in determining whether 
an individual qualifies as a common-law ‘employee’ in various tax law 
contexts[.]”31 The Court, however, did not explain its choice of listed 
factors or their relevance to any essential difference between employees 
and independent contractors that relates to the general purpose of federal 
statutes that use employment status to define the scope of their protections 
or benefit conferral. The Court, like the Restatement Second of Agency, 
 
 
27  The Restatement (Third) provided no further clarification. It adopted the right-to-control test 
in § 7.07, but acknowledged that “[i]n some employment relationships, an employer’s right of control 
may be attenuated. For example, senior corporate officers, like captain of ships, may exercise great 
discretion in operating the enterprises entrusted to them[.]” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07 
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
28  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
29  The six similar factors are (1) the skill required; (2) the source of the instrumentalities and 
tools; (3) the duration of the relationship between the parties; (4) the method of payment; (5) whether 
the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; and (6) whether the hiring party is in 
business. The additional factors are (1) the location of the work; (2) whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (3) the extent of the hiring party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; (4) the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; (5) the provision 
of employee benefit; and (6) the tax treatment of the hired party. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989). 
30  Id. at 752. 
31  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (citing Rev. Rul. 87-
41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298-299). 
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thus offered only an unstructured multifactor test that confers great 
discretion on trial judges and presents great uncertainty for lawyers.  
One important federal American employment statute, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), does supplement its circular definition of 
employee with an arguably more meaningful definition of “employ.”32 For 
purposes of the FLSA, to “‘[e]mploy’ includes to suffer or permit to 
work.”33 Soon after passage of the FLSA, the Court described this 
definition as the “broadest” in any statute,34 and the lower courts since 
have purported to interpret the scope of the FLSA protections more 
broadly than those of other statutes with only the circular definition of 
employee.35 They have done so, however, through consideration of 
multiple factors that mirror many of those included in both the § 220(2) 
list and the Court’s general common law list.36 The claim of the lower 
courts that their interpretation of the FLSA definition of “employ” focuses 
on “economic realities” clarifies nothing, and as Judge Easterbrook noted, 
carries the curious implication that the common law definitions of 
employee are not based on reality.37 In fact, the various FLSA multifactor 
tests, whether or not applied to sweep more broadly than are the common 
law multifactor tests, are not more structured, focused, or clear. 
Multifactor tests can be helpful when a legal question turns on highly 
variant factual contexts. They cannot alone provide adequate rules of 
decision, however, without a structure provided by an ultimate question 
that the various factors are to answer. Without such a structure, these tests 
offer only minimally confined judicial discretion. Factors can be tallied 
without regard to relative weight, or alternatively ranked in importance 
and subordinated, without the judge revealing what considerations are 
actually driving a decision.38  
 
 
32  Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2018). 
33  Id. 
34  United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S 360, 364 n.3 (1945) (citing 81 CONG. REC. 7657 
(statement of Sen. Black)). 
35  See, e.g., Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Corp., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998); Usery 
v. Pilgrim Equipment Co., Inc., 527 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1976). 
36  The factors used in FLSA cases vary between the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor 
v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987) (factors include employer’s control over work, the 
degree of employee’s investment in equipment and materials, whether the work requires special skill, 
and the degree of permanency or duration of the work). 
37  See id. at 1540 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“This implies that the definition of ‘independent 
contractor’ used in tort cases is inconsistent with ‘economic reality’ but that the seven factors applied 
in FLSA cases capture that ‘reality.’ In which way did ‘economic reality’ elude the American Law 
Institute and the courts of 50 states?”). 
38  Cf. RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 86-87 (Harvard Univ. Press 2013) 
(criticizing appellate judges for using multifactor tests to avoid policy analysis).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/7
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American multifactor tests not only have not offered a structure or 
ultimate standard, they also have not paid particular attention to the 
relative needs of the workers who could be covered by employment 
statutes or the ease with which they can be manipulated by employers 
wishing to escape the costs of incurring responsibility. Any compelling 
boundary for employment statutes must distinguish among sets of workers 
with significantly different needs of having other entities provide the 
minimum protections and benefits offered by the statutes. Although any 
distinction only offers a default standard that can be modified to serve the 
purposes of any particular statute, the definition must at least provide an 
economically relevant base line, particularly because the pull of the 
common law’s legitimacy resists modification. Furthermore, given the 
incentives for employers to cut labor costs by avoiding liability and 
responsibility for protections and benefits promised by employment 
statutes, the definition has to be one that cannot be easily manipulated by 
employers through the structuring of their labor market and their formal 
contractual commitments. 
II. BRITISH LAW 
The United Kingdom’s matrix of worker protection and benefit 
statutes,39 like those of the U.S., limit their beneficiaries to workers in 
particular economic relationships. The economic relationship required by 
some of the statutes seems more encompassing than that required by 
others,40 but all the statutes share three characteristics, two of which are 
 
 
39  The most important current statutes include: Equality Act 2010 c. 15, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents (prohibiting employment discrimination); 
Employment Rights Act 1996 c. 18, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/contents 
(prohibiting unfair dismissal; requiring compensation for redundancy; requiring written statement of 
employment terms; requiring notice of dismissal); Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992 c. 52, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/52/contents (providing labour union 
protections and benefits); National Minimum Wage Act 1998 c. 39, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/39/contents; Employment Relations Act 1999 c. 26, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/26/contents (leave for dependent care); Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 c. 37, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37/contents (setting employer duties 
relating to worker health and safety). See also The Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833 
(working time limitations; paid annual leave). 
40  The Employment Rights Act 1996 defines a “worker” as  
an individual who has entered into or works under (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any 
other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, 
whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for 
another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or 
customer of any profession or business carried on by the individual.  
Employment Rights Act 1996 § 230(3). See also Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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also shared with American statutes and one of which is not.  
The two shared characteristics are (1) that the required economic 
relationships do not include those with independent businesses or 
contractors, and (2) that the line between protected and unprotected 
relationships is not adequately drawn by statutory language and thus 
requires judicial elaboration. The unshared characteristic is British law’s 
conditioning of protection on the relationship being contractual,41 while 
American law requires only a status of employment.42  
The two shared characteristics have resulted in British courts struggling 
like American courts to distinguish protected workers from independent 
contractors without resort to unfocused multifactor tests. U.K courts, like 
U.S. courts, and the ALI Restatements of Agency, have understood that a 
simple control test cannot make distinctions that accord with past 
precedents, including those that define respondeat superior liability.43 
British courts thus also have stressed additional factors, including whether 
the worker bears the risk of profit or loss,44 and the degree to which a 
worker is integrated into the putative employer’s organization, especially 
 
 
Act 1992 § 296. Some important rights, however, including those to complain of unfair dismissal and 
to claim compensation for redundancy, are granted only to those covered by limb (a) of this definition, 
those with a “contract of employment.” See  §§ 94(1), 135. See also infra text accompanying notes and 
notes 64-70.  
41  See the Employment Rights Act 1996 definition of “worker,” supra note 39. Simon Deakin, 
in numerous writings, has traced the origins of the use of contract as a basis for U.K. employment 
protections to contingent choices made in twentieth century welfare legislation rather than to the 
dictates of common law jurisprudence. Deakin’s work demonstrates that post-War British legislators 
wanted lower status manual workers, who had been treated as servants to a master in a contract of 
service, to be categorized with higher status workers in contracts of employment. See, e.g., Simon 
Deakin, Does the Personal Employment Contract Provide a Basis for the Reunification of Employment 
Law?, 36 INDUS. L.J. 68, 74-75 (2007); Simon Deakin, The Many Futures of the Contract of 
Employment, in LABOR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 184-88 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 
2001). See also DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note 1, at ch. 2. Long term, relational work contracts of 
course were most common in the U.K. as in the U.S. during the mid-century, post-War decades. The 
elevation of contracts of service to contracts of employment, however, set up an unfortunate 
dichotomy with other forms of more casual work relationships that proliferated later in the century. 
See MARK R. FREEDLAND, THE PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 16-17 (Paul Davies et al., 
eds., 2003). 
42  Some British commentators have argued that U.K. law should not base employment rights on 
the existence of a “contract of service.” See Bob Hepple, Restructuring Employment Rights, 15 INDUS. 
L.J. 69, 74 (1986) (“the contract of service should be replaced by a broad definition of an 
‘employment relationship’ between the worker and the undertaking to work in return for pay.”). Others 
contend that British law is committed to contractual analysis, but that such analysis is sufficiently 
capacious to encompass any appropriately protected economic relationship. See FREEDLAND, supra 
note 41, at 6. 
43  See, e.g., White v. Troutbeck SA [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1171 (appeal taken from EAT); [2013] 
IRLR 949; [2014] ICR D5 CA (Civ). See also Hepple, supra note 42. 
44  See, e.g., Mkt. Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of Soc. Sec. [1969] 2 QB 173. 
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in cases where the worker is highly skilled.45 Like American courts, 
however, the British courts have not settled on a particular set of factors or 
an ultimate organizing standard to distinguish independent contractors.46 
Significantly, the unshared characteristic, the British statutes’ 
requirement that protected workers have a contractual relationship with a 
legally responsible entity, has resulted in other layers of confusion and 
unnecessary rigidity in U.K. law. The more important doctrinal rigidity 
has been the conditioning of a contract of employment on a mutuality of 
obligations between workers and a putative employer.47 This doctrine, 
which does not derive directly from contract law,48 has provided special 
difficulties for casual workers who are not given commitments of future 
work and who are not asked to commit to accepting any work that is 
offered. The British courts have held that such casual workers do not have 
a general or “umbrella” contract on which their continuing status as 
employees can be based.49  
This doctrine developed even though there is no compelling reason 
why employee protection or benefit statutes should treat differently 
workers who render service outside the coverage of a general “umbrella” 
or “global” contract in consideration for an employer’s promise of 
remuneration.50 Whether or not workers under or outside such an umbrella 
 
 
45  See, e.g., Stevenson Jordan & Harrison Ltd. v. MacDonald & Evans [1952] 69 RPC 10 CA, 
22 (Lord Denning) (“[U]nder a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business and his 
work is done as an integral part of the business; whereas under a contract for services, his work, 
although done for the business, is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it.”). 
46  Compare, e.g., Mkt. Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of Soc. Sec. [1969] 2 QB 173 (applying 
multifactor test to determine whether worker is performing services “in business on his own account”), 
with, e.g., Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions & Nat’l Ins. [1968] 2 QB 
497 (applying unfocused multifactor test to find driver-owners of lorries to be independent 
contractors). See also, Wickens v. Champion Emp’t [1984] ICR 365 (EAT) at 369-70 (applying a 
‘common sense’ balancing test). 
47  See, e.g., Nethermere (St. Neots) Ltd. v. Gardiner [1984] ICR 612 (Stephenson, LJ) (“There 
must … be an irreducible minimum of obligations on each side to create a contract of service.”); 
O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] QB 90 (upholding tribunal finding that casual workers did not 
have a contract of employment without having an obligation to take work). 
48  Contract law requires consideration and thus commitment, but it does not require that the 
consideration and commitment be of the same sort. See Hugh Collins, Employment Rights of Casual 
Workers, 29 INDUS. L.J. 73 (2000). See also Douglas Brodie, Employees, Workers and the Self-
Employed, 34 INDUS. L J. 253, 255 (2005).  
49  See, e.g., Carmichael v. National Power Plc [1999] 1 WLR 2042, [1999] 4 All ER 897 (HL). 
See also Collins, supra note 48. 
50  The mutuality of obligations doctrine and the notion of some overarching umbrella 
agreement seems particularly unsuitable for employment contracts without definite terms. See Julia 
Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in 
Employment, 66 S.C. L. REV. 315, 349-53 (2014) (criticizing the use of contract law to explain a 
continuing employment relationship, given the inequality of bargaining power and the general 
incompleteness of terms). “The only way to construe employment as a ‘contract’ is to think of it as a 
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contract labor for sufficient periods of time to be covered by a statute, they 
should have the same protection if their working hours were the same. The 
need of a worker for protections and benefits is surely not less if the 
worker has no commitment of future work from an employer. 
British courts, after a period of uncertainty, thus were compelled to 
address the problem posed by the mutuality of obligations condition by 
recognizing that workers without a general umbrella contract with a 
particular employer may still qualify as employees based on a series of 
more specific employment contracts covering each separate period of 
work.51 The decisions now recognize that there is an obligation to perform 
and compensate service during each specific period. To achieve protection 
under statutes requiring continuity of employment,52 however, casual 
workers still must be able to establish that any break in service between 
the specific contracts qualifies as a “temporary cessation of work” under 
the relevant employment law.53 Courts have been hesitant to do so where 
the break in work is long or where other workers have been substituted.54   
The other doctrinal impediment to employment status derived by 
British courts from the statutes’ requirement of contractual status is that 
the employee’s obligation be for personal service. Even an employee who 
has committed to future work performance may not have the actual 
performance of this work covered by British employment statutes if he or 
she did not commit to doing the work personally.55  
A commitment of personal service may be relevant to the 
demonstration that the service will be rendered as an employee rather than 
as an independent business; individuals running independent businesses in 
 
 
contract that is continuously renewed at each moment the relationship endures and in which both 
employee and employer provide consideration through performance.” Id. at 354. 
51  See, e.g., Cornwall CC v. Prater [2005] EAT; sub nom. Prater v. Cornwall CC [2006] EWCA 
(Civ) 102, [2006] 2 All ER 1013. See also A.C.L. Davies, Casual Workers and Continuity of 
Employment, 35 INDUS. L.J. 196 (2006). 
52  See Employment Rights Act 1996 c. 18 §§ 210-13. Examples of regulations requiring 
continuity of work include The Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999, SI 1999/312, reg. 
13(1); The Flexible Working Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1398, reg. 3.  
53  See Employment Rights Act 1996 § 212(3). This is made easier by the law no longer 
requiring a minimum number hours of work in a week in which there is an employment contract for 
purposes of determining continuity. See id. at § 212(1). See also The Employment Protection (Part-
time Employees) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/31. 
54  See A.C.L. Davies, The Contract for Intermittent Employment, 36 INDUS. L.J. 102, 115 
(2007), and cases cited therein.  
55  See, e.g., Express & Echo Publ’ns Ltd. v. Tanton [1999] ICR 693, [1999] IRLR 367 CA 
(clause requiring driver to find a substitute at his own expense if he was sick or otherwise unable to 
work meant no requirement of personal service). This requirement does not apply to homeworkers, 
those who contract to do work in a place not under the employer’s control. See Employment Rights 
Act 1996 § 43K(1)(b); National Minimum Wage Act 1998 c. 39 § 35(2). 
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their own interest generally will have the discretion to satisfy contractual 
commitments through the allocation of workers as well as capital.56 
Moreover, the British courts have mitigated the impact of the personal 
service requirement by recognizing that contractual provisions that allow 
or require substitute workers may not reflect the reality of the economic 
relationship and contract, and thus can be set aside as shams.57  
However, in cases where there is not a true independent business being 
operated, a worker’s actual discretion to share hours with or substitute 
another laborer to do the same work and collect the same pay is not 
relevant to whether performed work warrants protection or benefits. The 
actually performed work of a contractually bound worker or a substituted 
worker is in no less need of protections or benefits because the 
contractually obligated worker had the discretion to enlist the substitute. 
Drawing a distinction based solely on a personal service commitment, like 
drawing a distinction based on the existence of an overarching mutuality 
of obligations, constitutes doctrinal formalism with no nexus to the 
purpose of employee protection or benefit statutes. Both distinctions only 
serve to provide employers with possible loopholes to obtain cheaper labor 
by escaping the force of employment statutes. 
Although British courts by formulating contract doctrine may have 
made even worse use of the common law than American courts when 
setting the bounds of employment statutes, Parliament, unlike Congress, 
has at least made some purposeful attempts to break these judicial bounds. 
Consider in particular the broader definition of “worker” applicable to 
protections provided by the new Labour Government, such as the National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998 (NMWA),58 the Working Time Regulations 
1998 (WTR),59 and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.60 These 
provisions cover not only workers with “(a) contract of employment,” but 
also those subject to “(b) any other contract … whereby the individual 
 
 
56  Thus, the decision in Mirror Newspaper Grp. Ltd. v. Gunning [1986] 1WLR 546, [1986] 1 
All ER 385 CA, seems to have correctly rejected employment status for a daughter who took over 
ownership of her deceased father’s newspaper delivery business. 
57  See Autoclenz Ltd. v. Belcher [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] 4 All ER 745, [2011] ICR 1157. The 
recognition of sham written contracts also may be applicable to clauses that do not provide for mutual 
obligations. See Alan L. Bogg, Sham Self-Employment in the Supreme Court, 41 INDUS. L.J. 328 
(2012). 
58  See National Minimum Wage Act 1998. 
59  See The Working Time Regulations 1998 SI 1998/1833. These regulations implemented the 
original European Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of 
working time. Council Directive 93/104, 1993 O.J. (L 307) 18 (EC), since superseded by Working 
Time Directive 2003/88/EC. Council Directive 2003/88, 2003 O.J. (L 299) 9 EC). 
60  This protection of whistle blowing is now embodied in the Employment Rights Act 1996 c. 
18 §§ 43A-L.  
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undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another 
party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a 
client or customer of any profession or business carried on by the 
individual.”61 Further, the Equality Act 2010 consolidated U.K. 
prohibitions of discrimination based on race, sex, age, disability, gender 
reassignment, marriage, pregnancy and childbirth, religion or belief, and 
sexual orientation for those who are employed under or apply to be 
employed under “a contract personally to do work.”62  
This legislation represents commendable attempts to break free of the 
controlled and subordinated servant model of employment.63 The attempts 
fall short for several obvious reasons, however. First, the distinctions made 
by the definitions, especially in the second prong of the worker definition, 
are far from clear.64 Ambiguity again may require judicial resort to 
unfocused common law tests. 
Second, the lack of clarity is compounded by the absence of rationales 
for not expanding coverage in all employment protection and benefit 
statutes. Providing especially broad coverage for any prohibition of 
discrimination is easy to justify, but less obvious are rationales for not 
providing equally broad coverage for such topics as unfair dismissal,65 
redundancy pay,66 dismissal notice,67 and family-friendly leave.68 Why are 
such topics distinct from those covered by the “worker” definition, such as 
minimum wages69 and vacation pay?70 Parliament seemed to recognize the 
inconsistency in 1999 by giving the Secretary of State power to extend all 
 
 
61  See id. at § 230(3); National Minimum Wage Act 1998 § 54; The Working Time Regulations 
1998 reg. 2. See also Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 c. 52 § 296(1). 
62  Equality Act 2010 c. 15 § 83. But cf. Jivraj v. Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, [2011] 1 WLR 
1872, [2012] 1 All ER 629 (explaining that the definition covers only contracts of subordination). 
Recent cases indicate that the coverage of the Equality Act is commensurate with that of limb (b) in 
the definition of worker in the 1998 provisions, despite the absence of the business or profession 
qualification in the Equality Act definition. See Pimlico Plumbers Ltd. v. Smith [2017] EWCA (Civ) 
51 [48], [92]; Bates van Winkelhof v. Clyde & Coo LLP [2014] UKSC 32 [67]. 
63  Furthermore, British tribunals recognized this purpose for the expanded definition of worker 
in the 1998 regulations. See, e.g., Byrne Brothers (Formwork) Ltd. v. Baird & Others [2002] ICR 667 
(EAT) [17(4)] (“The reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that they are in a 
subordinate and dependent position vis-a-vis their employers; the purpose of the Regulations is to 
extend protection to workers who are, substantively and economically, in the same position.”). 
64  This criticism is made forcefully by Professor Freedland. See FREEDLAND, supra note 41, at 
25-26. 
65  See Employment Rights Act 1996 Pt X. 
66  See id. Pt XI. 
67  See id. § 1(4)(e) (written statement required); § 86 (minimum periods). 
68  See, e.g., id. §71 (maternity leave). 
69  See National Minimum Wage Act 1998 c. 39 § 1. 
70  See The Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833 reg. 13 (annual leave). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2019]   THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE   177 
 
 
 
 
employment protection rights generally to “workers,”71 but this power has 
never been invoked to issue regulations enabling workers to make claims 
for unfair dismissal or redundancy payments.  
The most important deficiency in the expanded definitions of coverage 
in some U.K. statutes is their continued insistence that protection depends 
on there being a contractual relationship between a protected worker and a 
responsible entity. The more significant aspect of this deficiency may not 
be continued judicial application of the personal service and mutuality of 
obligations doctrines in decisions applying the expanded definitions of 
coverage. While there have been such decisions,72 it seems likely that the 
courts’ more recent recognition that workers may have a series of separate 
contracts of service, even without an umbrella contract imposing 
continuing commitments to provide and accept work,73 will be most 
important in decisions under the expanded definition.74 As will be 
explained below, however, the requirement, even in the expanded 
definitions, that a worker’s economic relationship with a responsible 
employer be contractual poses special difficulties for cases where a worker 
has cause to claim the responsibility of multiple or joint employers, but 
has a true contractual relationship only with one.75  
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 
Ultimately, however, the cumbersome use of the common law to define 
the scope of employment statutes in the U.K., like the muddled use of it in 
the U.S., need not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the formulation of a 
default definitional standard that can be both clear and consistent with the 
usual purposes of such statutes. Indeed, if used not to delineate formalistic 
barriers based on inapplicable contractual or master-servant models, but 
rather to understand how modern societies might sensibly assign 
responsibility for the benefits and protections they wish to attach to work, 
 
 
71  See Employment Relations Act 1999 c. 26 § 23. 
72  See, e.g., Mingeley v. Pennock [2004] EWCA (Civ) 328 (race discrimination case); 
Byrne Brothers (Formwork) Ltd. v. Baird: [2002] ICR 667 (EAT) (working time regulations). See also 
Davies, supra note 51, at 104-05. A more recent controversial decision stumbling over the contractual 
requirement denied low paid food deliverer-bicyclists their statutory rights to bargain collectively 
because the bicyclists sometimes were able to substitute other bicyclists to perform their deliveries and 
thus did not undertake to perform work “personally.” Indep. Workers Union of Gr. Brit. v. RooFoods 
Ltd. TUR1/985 (Cent. Arb. Comm. 2016). 
73  See supra text accompanying note 50. 
74  See, e.g., Pimlico Plumbers Ltd. v. Smith [2018] UKSC 29; Aslam v. Uber B.V. [2017] 
IRLR 4, [2016] EW (Misc) B68 (ET); see also James v. Redcats (Brands) Ltd. [2007] ICR 1006, 
[2007] IRLR 296 (EAT). 
75  See infra text accompanying notes 142, 155-63. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
178 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:161 
 
 
 
 
 
the common law can contribute to a solution rather than aggravate the 
problem of defining coverage. Anglo-American common law can be used 
as a source of insight to define a compelling and clear default rule for 
coverage, consistent with what was proposed in the Restatement of 
Employment Law, and reachable through a liberal construction of British 
statutes as well.  
The common law that should be used as a source of insight is not that 
of contracts, but rather that of torts and agency. It is the law of respondeat 
superior, the law of vicarious liability of “masters” for the torts of their 
“servants.” This use of the law of vicarious liability may seem not only 
superficially obvious, but also fundamentally misguided. It may seem 
superficially obvious because it was precisely for purposes of respondeat 
superior vicarious liability that the nineteenth century common law of 
both the U.S. and the U.K. both first used the right-to-control details of 
work as the central factor to distinguish servants from independent 
contractors.76 
The use of vicarious liability as a source of insight for defining the 
scope of employment protection and benefit statutes, on the other hand, 
may seem fundamentally misguided because the master-servant 
relationship and its central element of total subordination and control are 
not descriptive of labor relationships in modern economies.77 Not 
surprisingly, some employment law commentators who accept that a 
master’s control over a servant may be part of the justification for 
imposing liability on the master for the servant’s torts reject the control 
test as a basis for a sufficiently expansive scope for employment statutes.78 
 
 
76  Modern legal historians, however, have highlighted that a right-to-control test was not 
originally formulated as central to respondeat superior analysis. See MARC LINDER, THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 133-50 
(1989); DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 142-46. Linder concludes that the test emerged in the 
U.S. only late in the nineteenth century with the encouragement of treatise drafters to restrict the scope 
of vicarious liability in the interest of developing capitalism. LINDER, supra, at 143-46. Deakin & 
Wilkinson conclude that “[t]he control test was only clearly asserted later [in the U.K.] in cases 
concerning, not the common law of vicarious liability, but the scope of social legislation.” DEAKIN & 
WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 91. 
77  See DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 90; Otto Kahn-Freund, Servants and 
Independent Contractors, 14 MOD. L. REV. 504, 505-506 (1951).  
78  See, e.g., LINDER, supra note 76, at 43-46; Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the 
Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 482 (2016); Richard R. 
Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop 
Trying, 22 BERKELEY. J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 311-14 (2001). Furthermore, modern writers have 
advocated expanding the service or work relationships that support vicarious liability. See, e.g., 
PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 140-43 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010); Ewan McKendrick, Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – 
A Re-Examination, 53 MOD. L. REV. 770, 784 (1990).  
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When considered from a somewhat different perspective, however, the 
law of respondeat superior and its distinction of independent contractors 
offer a very different and superior model for defining work that warrants 
the protection of modern employment statutes from that of a servant fully 
controlled by a master. That model is one of employer cost internalization 
where there is an alignment of employee duties and employer interests. It 
is the alignment of their duties with the interests of their employers, not 
their employers’ control over their work, that best distinguishes employees 
from independent contractors for purposes of respondeat superior liability. 
Employer control over a worker is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
respondeat superior liability, while an alignment of an employee’s duties 
with the interests of the employer is both necessary and sufficient. 
That master-employer control, or even right to control, is not sufficient 
for respondeat superior liability is clear from the “scope of employment” 
condition on such liability.79 Under the law of respondeat superior, an 
employer is liable for torts committed by its employees, even when those 
torts are committed through acts contrary to the employer’s instructions,80 
as long as the employees are intending to act in accord with their duty to 
serve the interests of their employer within the scope of their 
employment.81 Whenever the employees, however, depart from their 
employer-aligned duties in pursuit of their own independent interests, “on 
a frolic of their own” as described in the memorable phrase,82 liability for 
 
 
79  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  
An employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting 
within the scope of employment. 
(1) An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work 
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the 
employer’s control. An employee’s act is not within the scope of 
employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not 
intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT OF 
EMP’T LAW § 4.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  
80  See, e.g., Limpus v. London Gen. Omnibus Co. (1862)158 Eng. Rep. 993, [1862] 1 Hurl. & 
C. 526 (bus driver’s violation of employer’s instructions not to obstruct passage by another bus); 
Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry. [1873] LR 8 CP 148 (liability for mistaken use of 
authority in course of employment); McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying 
California law, even willful and malicious torts contrary to employer’s instructions can be the basis of 
vicarious liability if in course of performance of employee’s job.). See also P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 198-99 (1967). 
81  See, e.g., Ellis v. Turner (1800) 101 Eng. Rep. 1529, 1531, 8 TR 531, 533 (“The defendants 
are responsible for the acts of their servant in those things that respect his duty under them, though 
they are not answerable for his misconduct in those things that do not respect his duty to them.”); 
Laugher v. Pointer (1826) 108 Eng. Rep. 204, 5 B & C 547.  
82  See, e.g., Joel v. Morison (1834) 6 Car. & P. 501, 503 (“The master is only liable where the 
servant was acting in the course of his employment. If he was going out of his way, against his 
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any torts they commit is not imputed to their employer.83 This 
qualification is not explained by the level of control over its employees the 
employer exercises, or has the right to exercise, because that level of 
control does not change when the employees take a detour from their 
duties to pursue their own interests. Rather what changes is the alignment 
of the employees’ purposeful actions with their duties to serve the interests 
of their employer.84 
The misalignment of an independent contractor’s duties with the 
interests of even an economically dominant contractor, rather than some 
variation on a control test, also explains why the dominant contractor is 
not responsible for an economically subordinate but independent 
contractor’s torts. An economically dominant contractor could increase its 
control over an economically subordinate contractor, and presumably 
would do so with a sufficient incentive of potential liability. But potential 
control is not sufficient for vicarious liability when the subordinate 
contractor retains discretion over sufficient resources to pursue, at least to 
some extent, its own independent interests in its performance of work for 
the dominant contractor.85    
Thus, control or the potential for control is not a sufficient condition 
for the imposition of respondeat superior liability; the tortfeasor also must 
be exercising duties in alignment with the interests of the principal.86 
Furthermore, control or the potential for control also is not a necessary 
condition of respondeat superior liability. Courts impose such liability 
when employees are performing their duties in alignment with the interests 
of their employer, regardless of whether the employer is actually in a 
position to control this performance.87 This explains, better than any 
 
 
master’s implied commands, when driving on his master’s business, he will make his master liable; but 
if he was going on a frolic of his own, without being at all on his master’s business, the master will not 
be liable.”).  
83  See, e.g., Storey v. Ashton [1869] 4 QB 476 (no vicarious liability because “they turned off 
in a different direction and proceeded to the clerk’s house for purposes of their own”).  
84  An alignment principle was expressed in British law as early as 1800: “The defendants are 
responsible for the acts of their servant in those things that respect his duty under them, though they 
are not answerable for his misconduct in those things that do not respect his duty to them.” Ellis v. 
Turner, (1800) 101 Eng. Rep. 1529, 1531, 8 TR 531, 533.   
85  See, e.g., Earle v. Hall, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 353, 361 (1841) (owner of land not liable for acts 
of builders’ employees where builder “could in no sense be considered as building this house on 
account of Hall; but on his own account. He was building it on land of which Hall at the time held the 
fee, as security for the purchase money of the land; but he had a covenant for a conveyance, which 
might be specifically enforced; and when performed, the building would enure wholly to his benefit.”). 
86  Control of course has not been a sufficient condition for imposing vicarious liability on other 
superordinate parties, including supervisors of employees, as well as parents and teachers of children.  
87  See, e.g., Yates v. Brown, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 23, 24 (1829) (owner of vessel is liable for 
injury to other vessel “notwithstanding there may be a pilot on board, who has the entire control and 
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unpredictable multifactor test, why corporate chief executives, airplane 
pilots, ship captains, orchestra maestros, gourmet cooks, traveling 
salespersons and long distance truck drivers all can impose liability on 
their employers through torts committed while loyally performing their 
discretionary duties in the scope of their employment, even though outside 
any practical ability of their employer to control.88 
The principle that justifies an alignment with employer-interests-
standard for respondeat superior liability might be termed reciprocal cost 
internalization: an entity that causes and benefits from the service of 
workers should have to pay the reciprocal external social costs resulting 
from that work, at least whenever the workers cannot themselves pay.89 
This principle, of having to ensure payment for dangers created in service 
to your interests, has great social appeal90 and explains the boundaries of 
respondeat superior liability.  
The principle differs from and explains better these boundaries than 
does one based solely on providing incentive for an economically efficient 
 
 
management of the vessel.”). Alignment of interests also explains better than control why the common 
law makes a partnership and each partner vicariously liable for the torts of co-partners within the scope 
of the partner’s service to the partnership, regardless of whether the co-partners are subject to the 
control of other partners. See, e.g., Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1948) (applying 
Oregon law); Ashworth v. Stanwix [1860] 3 E. & E. 701. 
88  See supra text accompanying note 23. From the seminal case of Bush v. Steinman, (1799) 
126 Eng. Rep. 978, finding a home owner liable for the torts of contractors he could not control, the 
British courts have rested respondeat superior liability as much on the principal benefitting from 
service as on the principal’s control of service. The Bush decision emphasis on the principal’s 
benefitting was qualified to account for the unaligned discretion of an “independent business” 
contractor. See, e.g., Allen v. Hayward, (1845) 115 Eng. Rep. 749, 7 QB 960, 975. But the British 
courts continued to focus on whether the defendant principal benefitted from the work of the tortious 
workers through an integrated business operation, or only indirectly through the workers’ service to an 
independent business. See, e.g., Reedie v. The London & North Western Ry., (1849) 4 Ex. 244, 154 
Eng. Rep. 1201. A particularly direct judicial statement concerned a comedian found to be employed 
by theatrical producers in Stagecraft, Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Ins. (1952) SC 288:  
His value as a servant lies in his individuality and he is frequently employed just because he 
can exercise specialized skill which the employer does not possess. The employer of such a 
servant can direct the objective to which the servant’s skill is to be addressed but he is 
powerless to control the manner in which the servant’s skill is exercised. 
Id. at 297-298 (L.J. Clerk). See also LINDER, supra note 76, at 137-144.  
89  Cf. Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1295-330 (2001) (explaining that respondeat superior liability, like workers’ 
compensation law and enterprise liability, is based on notions of the fairness of enterprises paying for 
costs of injuries their activities cause); Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of 
Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997) (developing the fairness argument through 
Kantian analysis). 
90  See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(citing the “deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for 
accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:161 
 
 
 
 
 
level of accident prevention.91 Imposing liability for an agent’s torts on a 
principal with the ability to control the agent of course provides incentives 
for the principal to prevent the torts.92 Further, where the transaction costs 
of control are low, some economic analysis indicates that requiring a 
dominant business with economic control over an insolvent supplier or 
distributor to pay the costs of the negligence of the supplier’s or 
distributor’s insolvent employees can achieve an efficient level of 
prevention.93 The law of respondeat superior, as it developed in the 
nineteenth century in both the U.K. and the U.S., however, does not 
impose vicarious liability on entities that benefit indirectly from the work 
of the tortfeasing employees of other independent employers who control 
the employees in their own independent interests.94  
Similarly, this principle of reciprocal internalization differs from and 
explains better the boundaries of respondeat superior liability than does 
the other most frequent principle of policy used to explain this form of 
vicarious liability, the principle of distributive justice.95 If a wider 
distribution of risk could justify vicarious liability, any large business 
would be required to act as an insurer against the torts of employees of the 
most tenuously connected smaller employers, at least when the 
employees’ torts were committed in the course of work that was somehow 
related to their employer’s connection with the large employer. Needless 
to say, this is inconsistent with the law of respondeat superior not 
imposing liability on dominant, larger enterprises for the torts of the 
employees of independent business contractors.96  
Once the alignment of employee duties with employer interests based 
 
 
91  See, e.g., GILIKER, supra note 78, at 241-243. For economic analysis, see George L. Priest, 
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundation of Modern Tort 
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985) (forcing enterprises to internalize costs of accidents 
attributable to their operations provides incentives for cost-justified prevention). 
92  An employer’s formal legal right to control employees it cannot in practice control because 
of the employees’ special expertise or distance, however, seems to not provide any rational 
justification for the respondeat superior doctrine based on incentives for prevention. 
93  See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1232, 1264-
1268 (1984) (explaining why franchisor vicarious liability would enhance social welfare). See also 
Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).  
94  See, e.g., Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 1965); Pack v. Mayor 
of New York, 8 N.Y. 222, 227 (1853); Reedie v. London & North Western Ry., (1849) 4 Ex. 244, 154 
Eng. Rep. 1201. 
95  See ATIYAH, supra note 79, at 22-28. Or to put it more cynically, “we have to admit that 
vicarious liability owes its explanation, if not its justification, to the search for a solvent defendant.” 
Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity, 20 MOD. L. REV. 220, 232 
(1957). 
96  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 94.  
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on reciprocal cost internalization is recognized as central to the common 
law of respondeat superior, the relevance of this law to defining the 
bounds of modern employment statutes can be clarified. These statutes 
define the minimum protections and benefits that a modern polity has 
determined should be associated with a given level of work. Because these 
protections and benefits do not exist in the absence of a statutory 
command, no entity can be charged with directly injuring workers by an 
act of omission without an assignment of responsibility for their provision. 
Employment statutes assign this responsibility by imposing affirmative 
duties on employers. These duties include both negative tort-like duties to 
avoid injury and also positive duties to provide benefits. The assigning of 
affirmative duties to incur the costs of the provision of statutory 
protections and benefits is like assigning responsibility for the costs of the 
torts of insolvent tortfeasors; a business or other entity should have 
responsibility to pay these costs only when it may reap the benefit of work 
aligned with its interests. Where there is such alignment, there should be 
responsibility based on a principle of reciprocity: an enterprise with the 
opportunity to benefit fully from work should be responsible for all of its 
potential social costs. Where there is not the full opportunity for benefit 
because the work’s vector is not fully aligned with the employer’s 
interests, a worker denied statutory benefits and protections is like a third 
party victim of the tort of an insolvent independent contractor. Both the 
worker and the victim must provide for themselves or seek support from 
society more generally. 
This alignment-reciprocal cost internalization analysis, though limiting, 
sets a very broad scope of work for which employers responsible for 
protections and benefits can be identified. The broad coverage is 
consistent and not burdened by the easily manipulated, formalistic 
categories that have plagued Anglo-American common law on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The coverage of work need not depend on an employer’s 
control, as long as the work is to be done and is intended to be done in the 
interests of the employer.97 Further, work covered under this analysis is 
not limited to work rendered under a contract of subordinate service rather 
than a contract for defined services.98 The latter through specifications and 
 
 
97  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 77-87. 
98  The Roman distinction between locatio operarum (contract for service) and locatio operis 
(contract of service) indeed ultimately provides no more than different language to identify the 
categories of employees and independent contractors. See ATIYAH, supra note 79, at 35-36 (“[T]he 
use of such terms is just another way of stating the problem and does not provide a test for its 
solution.”). 
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conditions can be as fully aligned as the former with the interests of a 
responsible employer.99 Even work not integrated into the core of an 
employer’s business organization100 may be performed in full alignment 
with the interests of an employer exercising control through contractual 
specifications.101 Finally, coverage need not depend on the existence of a 
contract for future work, whether or not with mutual obligations. The 
alignment-reciprocal cost internalization analysis of work can be applied 
ex post without consideration of ex ante obligations.102 
IV. USING THE RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The importance of alignment analysis and a reciprocal cost 
internalization basis for respondeat superior vicarious liability under 
Anglo-American common law should influence both American and British 
policy makers to reconsider their formulations of a default standard for the 
economic relationships protected by their employment statutes. Even 
without statutory modifications, however, at least American courts could 
move toward alignment analysis by use of the recently adopted 
Restatement of Employment Law. 
 The final adopted draft, in the critical language of the Restatement of 
Employment Law’s first section, 1.01, states that 
an individual renders services as an employee of an employer if . . . 
the employer controls the manner and means by which the 
individual renders services, or the employer otherwise effectively 
prevents the individual from render those services as an independent 
businessperson. . . . An individual renders services as an 
 
 
99  See Julia Tomassetti, supra note 50, at 368-389 (explaining how upfront contractual 
specifications can preclude worker independence as effectively as can general authority to control 
service). 
100 The integration test was used by some British courts to supplement a control test, especially 
for highly skilled employees like doctors who could not be placed under the effective control of 
employers like hospitals. See supra text accompanying note 45. See also GILIKER, supra note 78, at 
60-62, 69-70 (noting similar reasons for use of organization or integration test in vicarious liability 
cases).  
101 The test thus seems broader than the test advanced by Professor Collins in his creative 
attempt to formulate a sophisticated new test. See Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the 
Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment Protection Laws, 10 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 353, 377-80 (1990). Collins states that task performance contracts, which transfer economic 
risk to workers, should not be treated as employment contracts if the organization has no techniques of 
control beyond checking the adequacy of service. See id. The alignment test may have a broader scope 
where workers do not have adequate traditional or human capital to pursue independent interests when 
performing their task contracts. See infra text accompanying note 103. 
102 Cf. supra text accompanying note 49. 
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independent business person and not as an employee when the 
individual in his or her own interest exercises entrepreneurial 
control over important business decision, including whether to hire 
and where to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where to 
deploy equipment, and whether and when to provide service to 
other customers.103  
This formulation conveys the central idea that employees are those 
rendering service without actual control over the use of capital, including 
their own human capital, and the labor of others, to advance their own 
interests independently of the interests of any possible employers. 
Although the word “entrepreneurial” is used, the standard is better 
encapsulated as an independent business standard than as an 
entrepreneurial opportunity standard. The so-called common law standard 
of employer control over the manner and means of service is presented as 
a sufficient but not necessary way by which an employer prevents a 
controlled employee from operating an independent business through the 
allocation of capital and labor. As explained in the ALI-adopted comments 
to the formulation,104 workers whose manner and means of work is 
controlled by another entity are not allowed to make capital and labor 
allocation decisions for any independent interests that are not fully aligned 
with those of the controlling entity. Furthermore, as also explained in the 
comments,105 other workers, including the managerial, skilled, and off-site 
workers whose manner and means of work are not controlled, still may be 
prevented from rendering services in their independent interests by an 
alignment of their duties with the interests of an employer. Stated most 
succinctly, service is rendered as an employee rather than as an 
independent business person when the service renderer does not render the 
service with significant discretionary control over capital and labor. 
Retaining such control enables a business person to advance their own 
economic interests without also advancing proportionately the interests of 
another party that has denied such control.  
The default definition of employee stated in § 1.01 of the Restatement 
thus turns on the difference between independent discretionary control 
over capital and labor, on the one hand, and the lack of such control and 
the consequent alignment of the worker’s service with the interests of a 
controlling entity, on the other. This definition distinguishes employees 
 
 
103 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01(a)(3); § 1.01(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
104 §1.01 cmt. d. 
105 § 1.01 cmt. e. 
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due the protection and benefits of employment statutes primarily on the 
basis of relative need. Workers in a developed capitalist economy who can 
render service with control of capital and of labor are in a fundamentally 
stronger economic position to protect their own interests and provide for 
their own benefits than those who cannot.  
Furthermore, the distinction between independent discretion and 
controlled alignment also provides a basis for assigning responsibility for 
the provision of benefits and protections by determining whether there is 
another entity, or entities, that can more appropriately be assigned 
responsibility for the protections and benefits than can the workers 
themselves. If the workers do not have discretion to serve their own 
independent interests, if their service is to be aligned with the interests of a 
controlling entity, then that entity, or entities, can appropriately be 
assigned responsibility for the protections and benefits that the polity has 
determined are warranted by their work. Where the legal or economic 
relationship empowers the party served to prevent the service renderer 
from making decisions in its own interest about how capital and labor are 
used in the course of the service, there is an alignment of interests that 
warrants both respondeat superior vicarious liability and a default 
assumption, reversible of course in particular legislation, that the party 
who benefits from the service should internalize the costs of ensuring 
statutory protections and benefits for the server.   
The consistency of the alignment-reciprocal cost internalization 
analysis with § 1.01 does not of course establish that the analysis is 
mandated by common law decisions. As stated in the opening paragraphs 
of this essay,106 the common law is malleable and open to variant 
interpretations to provide legitimacy. The common law, however, also 
provides insight into social values. The interpretation given by § 1.01 and 
applied through an analysis supported by the policy underlying respondeat 
superior liability not only draws from the insight of the common law, but 
also is well within the bounds of interpretive license.  
In addition, this interpretation and analysis provides both a compelling 
and easily applied standard. On the one hand, it sharply distinguishes from 
employment status owners of independent businesses operating in a raw 
material or component supply or distribution chain. These independent 
businesses hire and assign employees and deploy equipment and other 
capital in order to maximize their own profits rather than those of other 
businesses that the independent business owners benefit through sales or 
 
 
106 See supra Introduction. 
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purchases.  
On the other hand, it highlights that individuals who provide personal 
service to private or public enterprises do so as employees unless they 
have control over substantial capital or significantly differentiated human 
capital. Without such control, no service provider while providing service 
to one enterprise can command the ability to deploy capital or assign 
assistants in its independent interests.  A service provider without such 
control, like a plumber, a gardener or a delivery driver, may have 
discretion to provide service to others when it is not working for the 
enterprise, but unless such a provider has control over sufficient capital to 
increase its profits without also proportionately enhancing its service, the 
provider is serving the enterprise as an employee.   
The definition of employment focuses on whether particular “service” 
or work is rendered as an employee, not on whether the service renderer is 
an employee in the abstract. Thus, any individual can render service to 
multiple employers in multiple employment relationships seriatim. The 
fact that the plumber or gardener or delivery driver without significant 
capital can serve other enterprises at different times is not relevant to the 
question of whether particular service is rendered within an employment 
relationship. The Restatement of Employment indeed expressly anticipates 
seriatim employment relationships, occurring within a “given day, week, 
or other time period” in § 1.04(a).107 This also is in accord with how 
respondeat superior would be applied. We would expect any principal to 
be liable for the torts of an agent within the scope of their service, 
regardless of how many other principals the agent served within any given 
time period.108 
V. APPLYING RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND § 1.01 
To illustrate further the clarity, coherence, and sense of the interest 
alignment analysis drawn from vicarious liability and supported by § 1.01 
of the Employment Restatement, consider two overlapping kinds of 
 
 
107 § 1.04(a) states in full:  
An individual is an employee of two or more separate employers if (i) the individual renders 
services to each of the employers on a separate basis during a given day, week, or other time 
period and (ii) during such time period is subject solely to that employer’s control or 
supervision as provided in § 1.01(a)(3). 
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.04(a). 
108 See, e.g., Brasseaux v. Town of Mamou, 1999-1584, p. 8 (La. 1/19/00); 752 So. 2d 815, 821 
(part-time police officer). Not surprisingly, employment laws generally do not exclude part-time 
workers.  
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relationships with workers that are covered by interest alignment 
analysis.109 Classifying these relationships may be difficult for both 
American and British tribunals applying their current tools of analysis. 
The first set of relationships are ones in which an employer attempts to 
avoid employment laws by requiring contracts that transfer to the workers 
the risk of some limited control over marginal production costs.110 These 
contracts also may promise an opportunity for enhanced compensation 
through supervision of other employees. The transfer of risk may be 
accomplished through requiring the employees to lease or purchase, 
perhaps from the employer or through the employer’s financing 
mechanism, and also to service, equipment like a truck or lorry that is 
necessary for the employees’ work. The employer then requires the 
workers to use the equipment in service to the employer for periods and in 
a manner that make it very difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for 
the worker to reap profits from other use. Most importantly, the employer 
continues to set sufficient conditions on the worker’s use of the capital 
equipment during the periods of service to the employer to ensure that the 
worker’s obligations during these periods are fully aligned with the 
interests of the employer. 
FedEx, for instance, used this kind of system to cast the delivery 
drivers performing its core service as independent contractors with 
entrepreneurial opportunities and without protections under American 
employment laws.111 FedEx required the drivers to work long hours from 
Tuesday through Saturday, kept full control of the drivers’ territories and 
their compensation, determined the packages they needed to deliver each 
day, and required the use of specified vehicles with FedEx logos.112 
Numerous drivers thus challenged their classification by FedEx as 
independent contractors.113 Some courts that resisted classifying the 
 
 
109 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01. 
110 See, e.g., Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (owner-
operators may be treated as employees under the NLRA); Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. v 
Minister of Pensions & Nat’l Ins. [1968] 2 QB 497 (owner-operators of lorries did not have contracts 
of employment). Compare also Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998) (finding 
employee status), with Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998) (finding 
independent contractor status). 
111 For an excellent analysis of FedEx’s business model, see Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies 
to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1083, 1085 (2015). 
112 See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 510-511 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Garland, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the factual findings of the NLRB Regional Director). See also Tommasseti, 
supra note 111, at 1111 and cites therein. 
113 See, e.g., Gray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 799 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting summary judgment of employee status); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., 792 F.3d 818, 
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drivers as employees were influenced in part by FedEx’s policy of 
allowing some drivers to be compensated for the hiring and supervision of 
other drivers on their routes or even in multiple routes.114 Some courts also 
were influenced by FedEx’s claims that the drivers’ capital investment in 
their trucks provided them with an entrepreneurial opportunity to adjust 
their returns, through their responsibility for truck maintenance or their 
formal freedom to use the trucks on off days or to sell their trucks along 
with the transfer of their routes.115  
Whatever the extent of the FedEx drivers’ limited control over their 
trucks, or over other drivers on other routes, and the even more limited 
extent to which this control was exercised, however, the drivers were not 
able to deploy their trucks to serve their independent interests during the 
periods in which they were obligated to deliver FedEx packages on their 
own routes. They did not have any discretion to enhance their returns for 
their delivery work during this period except by advancing FedEx’s 
interests through delivering more packages.116 They had no discretion to 
use cheaper trucks or other equipment or to do other work during their 
mandated time of service to FedEx; their obligations during these hours 
were fully aligned with the interests of FedEx.117 Thus, just as FedEx, 
under this business model, should have been vicariously liable to any third 
party injured by a negligent FedEx driver during the delivery of FedEx 
 
 
821 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that drivers were employees as a matter of Kansas law, based on certified 
opinion of Kansas Supreme Court); Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 
1316, 1328 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting summary judgment of independent contractor status); Slayman 
v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding drivers were employees 
as a matter of California law); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that NLRB could not protect drivers as employees). 
114 See, e.g., Gray v. FedEx, 799 F.3d at 1000; FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d at 499; 
In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562, 588-89 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
115 See, e.g., Gray v. FedEx, 799 F.3d  at 1001; FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d at 
500; In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97.  
116 FedEx’s claim that the opportunity to transfer routes along with trucks made the drivers 
entrepreneurs seems exaggerated because FedEx retained the discretion to reassign territory, and did 
so to maintain strict control over the volume of work in each area. See Tomassetti, supra note 111, at 
1111. Thus, a driver could not enhance the value of a route for future sale by providing good service to 
attract additional customers.  
117 Theoretically, drivers could marginally enhance or detract from their net returns for their 
hours of service to FedEx by lower-cost use of their trucks in anticipation of their ultimate sale when 
transferring their routes. However, FedEx provided support for truck maintenance, taxes, and 
insurance, and exercised control over route transfers. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d at 
510-511 (Garland, J., dissenting). Drivers who supervised other routes might have been able to 
enhance their independent returns if FedEx permitted them to control costs on these routes, including 
the wages of subordinate drivers, but even if they operated as independent businesses through such 
supervision, they still were employees on their own routes. See Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 
Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 93 (2014) (holding under Kansas law that drivers were employees on the routes they 
service personally even if responsible for other routes). 
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packages, so should FedEx have been responsible for any employment 
benefits and protections, including for collective bargaining, associated 
with their drivers’ work delivering packages for FedEx. 
The second currently salient set of cases illuminated by interest 
alignment analysis involves the assignment of work through a digital 
platform that neither provides any guarantee of work nor requires any 
particular commitment to work.118 The absence of mutual commitments 
indicates why digital platforms could pose difficulty for the application of 
British statutes that condition coverage on the existence of a contract of 
employment that requires mutual obligations. However, as the example of 
Uber drivers demonstrates, digital platforms have presented classification 
controversies for American tribunals as well.119 Even liberal academics, 
like the economist Alan Krueger and the law professor Seth Harris, both 
Obama administration veterans,120 have taken the position that the 
discretion of workers like Uber drivers to choose when to make 
themselves available to work probably removes them from the status of 
employee under American common law and requires the formulation of a 
new legal category of “independent worker,” with some protections, not 
including the minimum wage guaranteed employees covered by the 
FLSA.121  
Nevertheless, a decision of a British Employment Tribunal in Aslam v. 
Uber122 appropriately treated Uber drivers as workers under the second 
“(b) limb” of the definition in the NMWA, the WTR regulations, and the 
Employee Rights Act 1996,123 based on a rich contextual multifactor 
analysis.  Unlike the ex-Obama administration officials, the Tribunal 
recognized that the drivers were as much in need of the protection of the 
applicable employment laws as drivers of a traditional transportation 
 
 
118 For various discussions, see Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co: 
Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 
J. 619 (2016); Rogers, supra note 78; Nat’l Emp. L. Project, Employers in the On-Demand Economy 
(2016); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern 
Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1673, 1684-1688 (2016); Wilma B. Liebman & Andrew Lyubarsky, 
Crowdwork, the Law, and the Future of Work, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, 2016; Seth D. Harris & Alan 
B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The 
“Independent Worker”, (The Hamilton Project, Washington, D.C., Dec. 2015). 
119 See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 118, at 1688, for cases filed against Uber’s 
classification of its drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. 
120 Harris served, inter alia, as Deputy Secretary of Labor, and Krueger was Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors.  See Harris & Krueger, supra note 118, at 34. 
121 See Harris & Krueger, supra note 118, at 20.  
122 Aslam v. Uber B.V. [2016] IRLR 4, aff’d [2017] RTR 14 (Eady, QC).   
123 See supra text accompanying notes and notes 57-60. 
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company.124  
Assigning the drivers an appropriate full employee status would be 
much easier and more straightforward, however, under § 1.01 of the 
Restatement of Employment Law, through analysis that asked simply 
whether the drivers were able to utilize their capital and controlled labor in 
their own interest without directly benefiting aligned Uber interests in 
doing so. Working under the business relationships as described in 
Aslam,125 the drivers could not.  After logging on to make themselves 
available for Uber-solicited rides, the drivers had to accept most fares that 
Uber offered.126 Uber set the price the riders paid, collected the fare, and 
paid the drivers a share.127 Uber also prohibited the drivers from 
exchanging information to form future relationships with riders.128 While 
in Uber’s pool of available drivers, drivers had no discretion to use the 
limited capital invested in their cars in a way that could benefit them 
without proportionately benefitting Uber.129 The drivers’ duties were fully 
aligned with Uber’s interests.  
Thus, just as the Uber described in Aslam should be vicariously liable 
to riders or other third parties for injuries caused by the negligence of Uber 
drivers, so should Uber presumably be responsible for ensuring the 
protections and benefits defined in employment statutes. An Uber driver’s 
ability to use a car at a different time for the riders of a competitor like 
Lyft is irrelevant. The alignment analysis is applied to particular work; as 
 
 
124 See Aslam, [2016] IRLR 4 [86-97].  
125 See id. [15-58]. For another consistent description of the Uber business model, see O’Connor 
v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135-1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying Uber’s motion for 
summary judgment based on claims drivers were independent contractors for purposes of California 
Labor Code). For a description of a similar business model of Uber’s prime competitor, see Cotter v. 
Lyft, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069-1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying cross motions for summary 
judgment on whether drivers are independent contractors or employees for purposes of California 
Labor Code). See also Case C-434/15, Asociacion Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Sys. Spain, 2017 
(Uber connecting individuals with drivers constitutes the provision of transportation services and thus 
can be regulated as such by EU member states).  
126 See Aslam [2016] IRLR 4 [48], [52-54]. 
127 See id. [18-21].  
128 See id. [50]. 
129 The fact that drivers could use their vehicles at other times to serve other interests is 
irrelevant to the question of whether an employer has sufficient control of the use of the vehicles 
during particular periods to ensure that the vehicles’ use is aligned with its interests. To be an 
independent business person, a service worker during the period of service must have control over the 
use of any relevant capital goods; ownership of the goods is not sufficient. Furthermore, modern 
computer technology enables firms with more significant capital to exercise periodic control of capital 
owned by service workers.  See Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial 
Corporation and Advanced Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 1, 63-65 
(2016). 
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noted above,130 a worker may have multiple employers seriatim.131  
The work of service providers connected to clients or customers by a 
digital platform need not be aligned with the interests of the platform in all 
cases, however. If digital workers merely pay their platform a flat 
facilitation or finder’s fee for each connection132 and also retain discretion 
to bargain for their own price with the threat of non-service, employee 
status is not appropriate because the workers’ obligations are not aligned 
with the interests of the platform. Worker obligations and platform 
interests would not be aligned in that case because the platform benefits 
from further connection fees made possible by satisfied customers who 
feel they received a good bargain, while the workers are free to attempt to 
reap greater benefits only for themselves by deploying their labor and 
capital at a higher price without Uber garnering a higher commission. The 
ability to take a higher proportion of a higher price, perhaps through cost 
control discretion, as well as the discretion to set a price,133 is necessary 
for independent business status, however. Even if a worker is delegated 
price setting discretion for a business, as long as the business reaps a 
percentage of the net returns for the worker’s service, the worker’s service 
obligations stay closely aligned with the interests of the business.134   
 
 
130 See supra text accompanying note 107. 
131 Some courts, however, have mistakenly treated the freedom of workers to work at different 
times for other employers or even for themselves as a critical factor in disproving their employment 
during particular work for one employer. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 
141-144 (2d Cir. 2017) (issuing summary judgment against black car drivers seeking employment 
status with dispatch company that negotiated fees with clients and received a portion of the drivers’ 
fares). The Aslam tribunal, in contrast, appropriately, and in accord with the Restatement of 
Employment Law, treated the time when the Uber drivers had their Uber app turned on as separable 
from time when they might have worked for possible competitors.  
132 In defending their treatment of drivers as independent businesses, Uber and Lyft have 
claimed to be mere facilitators of a product market between drivers and riders. See Tomassetti, supra 
note 129, at 13-16. This claim fails because the firms assign particular drivers and take a percentage of 
the fares they set rather than take a set fee and allow a free market to set fare levels. See id. at 23-28.  
133 Taxi drivers who must charge regulated fares, but pay a dispatching firm only a set fee to 
lease their cabs, rather than any portion of their fares, still may provide service in alignment with the 
interests of a dispatching firm exercising quality control to ensure well served and satisfied customers. 
The drivers can make more money only by working harder, rather than by any entrepreneurial 
allocation of capital or the labor of others. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Coop., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (lessor cab company exercised sufficient control 
over lessee drivers to be employer for purposes of workers’ compensation law). 
134 The alignment is close but admittedly not perfect, however, in a case where workers have 
some control of costs through use of their own capital on jobs for which they have discretion to set 
prices. For instance, if Uber drivers could set prices for rides in vehicles they owned, the drivers 
rationally would prefer to set higher prices than would Uber sharing proportionately in the fares. This 
is because the drivers would have to pay for depreciation of their vehicle. Because there presumably is 
less depreciation if there are fewer rides at higher rates, drivers would benefit a little more from higher 
prices than would Uber. In addition, a rider’s dissatisfaction from having to pay a high fee might be 
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In the real commercial world, most digital platforms, like Uber, charge 
a percentage commission to align their interests with the duties of workers 
to serve the platforms’ clients or customers.135 Most platforms also do not 
afford discretion to workers to pursue their independent interests by 
bargaining for special, higher returns from clients or customers identified 
by the platforms.136 Thus, most work assigned or obtained through a 
platform should qualify as fully protected employment.137  
This protection of work secured through digital platforms should not be 
limited to certain statutes because the work is casual or part time, or 
because the work was not performed under a “global” or “umbrella” 
contract with a mutuality of obligations. First, contrary to the assertion of 
Harris and Krueger, the coverage of most platform workers, no more than 
the coverage of other causal or part time workers, poses no intractable 
problem for benefits or protections that “depend on the measurement of 
working hours.”138 Harris and Krueger contend that the inability to 
determine the hours of digital workers like Uber drivers with discretion to 
decide when and how long to work, and even whether to work for 
competitors, means that they cannot be assured a minimum wage under 
the FLSA.  As the Tribunal in Aslam explained, however, the Uber drivers 
were at work for Uber whenever they logged on to the Uber app and made 
themselves available for an Uber assignment.139 Similarly, under the 
FLSA, workers unable to attend to personal business during hours while 
waiting on-call from their employer must be compensated for those 
 
 
directed to some extent at all Uber drivers, while the driver charging the high fee reaped all of the 
driver’s proportion of that fee.   
135 Mechanical Turk, Task Rabbit, and Upwork, for instance, all impose fees set as a percentage 
of the payment to workers. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 118, at 31-32; Pricing, AMAZON 
MECHANICAL TURK, www.mturk.com/pricing (last visited Oct. 30. 2018); UPWORK, 
www.upwork.com (last visited Oct. 30. 2018); TASKRABBIT, www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Oct. 
30. 2018).  
136 As long as it takes a commission, a platform can align its interests with individual workers’ 
duties even if, like Upwork, supra note 135, it allows its clients or customers to set price levels for 
variant tasks. Employer status for a platform that commands a percentage commission only should be 
denied for a platform that connects clients with businesses that can perform a task with discretion to 
allocate capital and labor for their own profit. By cutting costs, such businesses have discretion to 
pursue independent higher profits at any commission level.  
137 Indeed, in cases where workers do not exercise control over their own capital or have the 
ability to assign labor during performance of a task assigned through the platform, the workers may be 
jointly employed by the served client as well as by the platform. See infra text accompanying notes 
166-172. 
138 Harris & Krueger, supra note 118, at 20. 
139 See Aslam v. Uber B.V. [2016] IRLR 4 [86], aff’d [2017] RTR 14 (Eady, QC). See also 
Addison Lee Ltd. v. Gascoigne [2018] EAT/0289/17/LA (UK) (finding couriers to be covered workers 
when they logged in to accept assignments with pay and routes set by company). 
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hours.140 Indeed, computer-based records make the determination of on-
call work hours easier in the modern economy. Such records also can be 
used to determine whether the worker has worked enough hours for 
enough weeks over a long enough period of time to meet other statutory 
minima for benefits such as family leave, sick pay, holiday pay, 
redundancy pay, or even protection from unfair dismissal in the United 
Kingdom. There may have to be adjustments from the default coverage 
rule advocated here for maximum hour or overtime rules for workers who 
unilaterally can set unlimited long hours, free from employer pressure, but 
such adjustments do not require adoption of a general intermediate 
category of workers no less in need of most employment protections and 
benefits. 
Second, the explanation offered by the Aslam Tribunal of how the Uber 
drivers met the requirement of there being a “contract” under limb (b) of 
the definition of worker in the statutes applicable to the case also can be 
used to cover the drivers as employees under limb (a).141 If, as stated by 
the Tribunal, there is no need for an “overarching ‘umbrella’ contract” for 
there to be a “‘worker’ contract” covering periods during which a driver 
has the driver’s “App switched on” and is able and willing to accept 
assignments within an authorized territory,142 there also can be a contract 
of employment for even those short periods. Just as American law does 
not require an intermediate category for protected workers who are not 
employees, British law should not distinguish between employees and 
workers for purposes of some critical statutory protections.  
VI. JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE EMPLOYERS 
The kind of contracts treated in Aslam v. Uber as sufficient for worker 
status, using the “contract of employment” model as a condition of 
responsibility for employment protections, nonetheless poses even greater 
problems in the U.K. in cases where an employee’s duties are aligned with 
the interests of multiple parties, but the employee is in privity of contract 
with only one.143 Joint responsibility for the torts of controlled workers has 
 
 
140 See, e.g., Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 864 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1989) (“whether the 
employee can use the [on-call] time effectively for his or her own purposes” is critical issue). See 
generally Eric Phillips, On-Call Time Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 MICH L. REV. 2633 
(1997). 
141 For the full definition, see supra note 40.  
142 Aslam [2016] IRLR 4 [85-86]. 
143 British law of vicarious liability also has been hostile to the joint liability of two employers 
since dicta in Laugher v. Pointer (1826) 108 Eng. Rep. 204, 5 B & C 547, 558: “[t]he law does not 
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been recognized by American courts,144 however, and can be supported by 
the controlling principle of reciprocal cost internalization that underlies 
respondeat superior liability. Under similar analysis, in some cases more 
than one employer can be assigned responsibility for ensuring to particular 
workers the protections and benefits promised by modern employment 
statutes.  
Section 1.04(b) of the Restatement of Employment Law restated 
American law’s recognition of the possible responsibility of multiple 
entities to internalize the same costs of employee protections and benefits. 
The section states that “an individual is an employee of two or more joint 
employers if (i) the individual renders services to at least one of the 
employers and (ii) that employer and other joint employers each control or 
supervise such rendering of services as provided” in the section defining 
the employment relationship discussed above.145  
This Restatement section reflects American judicial and administrative 
decisions recognizing “joint employer” responsibilities for the provision of 
protections and benefits secured by employment statutes.146 Joint 
employers are distinct from single employers under American law. Single 
employers are under common ownership and control and thus do not have 
distinct ultimate interests.147 Joint employers do have distinct interests. 
 
 
recognize a several liability in two principals who are unconnected.” See also, e.g., Mersey Docks & 
Harbour Bd. v. Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd., sub nom. McFarlane v. Coggins & Griffith 
(Liverpool) Ltd. [1947] AC 1, [1946] 2 All ER 345 (HL). In this century, however, some British courts 
have accepted the possibility of more than one employer being vicariously liable for the same torts of 
one employee serving the interests of both employers. See, e,g, Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd. v. Thermal 
Transfer (Northern) Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1151, [2006] QB 510 (finding two employers liable for 
the negligence of one employee that served both). The American vicarious liability law recognized 
joint vicarious liability earlier. See, e.g., Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 45 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1946). 
144 See, e.g., Morgan v. ABC Mfr., 97-0956 (La. 5/1/98); 710 So. 2d 1077, 1085; Vargo v. 
Sauer, 576 N.W. 2d 656, 665 (Mich. 1998). See also Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974) 
(application under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“person may be the servant of two masters . . . 
at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the 
other.”). 
145 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.04(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
146 See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) (finding joint employment under 
the NLRA); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (finding joint employment under 
the FLSA); Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding joint employment under the 
Family Medical Leave Act); Antenor v. D. & S. Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding 
joint employment under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act); Amarnare v. 
Merrill Lynch, 611 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding joint employment under Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
147 Determination of single employer status, for instance, is critical for regulation of overtime 
under the FLSA. See, e.g., Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., 346 F.3d 908, 917 (“Whether two companies 
constitute a single enterprise for FLSA coverage and whether they are liable as joint employers . . . are 
technically separate issues.”). See also 29 C.F.R. § 779.203 (2018). American labor law also uses a 
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Nonetheless, particular work, and thus particular workers, can serve the 
interests of joint employers simultaneously if the interests of each do not 
conflict with respect to that particular work. This will be the case where 
the best rendering of particular efficient service to one employer serves the 
interests of a second employer.  
As explained more fully below, the rendering of efficient service to one 
employer can serve the aligned interests of a second employer in at least 
four kinds of relationships between the two employers. First, it can do so 
where one employer is paid for administering personnel policy, including 
staffing and hiring, termination, compensation and benefits, for a second 
employer that directs the performance of work in its interests.148 Second, it 
can do so where one employer both generally controls the work and 
compensation of the employees as a service to a set of customers who 
have some discretion to direct the service in their interest and also 
ultimately pay for the employees’ compensation.149 Third, it can do so 
where one employer is compensated by a second employer for ensuring 
that work serves the interests of the second employer.150 And, fourth, it 
may do so where the second employer otherwise has sufficient control 
over the first employer to ensure that the work is aligned with interests of 
the first employer that do not conflict with interests of its own.151 
Assigning joint and several responsibility to two employers for the 
provision of the same employment benefits of course does not mean that 
an employee can receive double benefits any more than vicarious liability 
can result in double recovery for an injured third party. One employer 
must be assigned primary liability, presumably the employer most directly 
involved in the denial of the benefit. The most direct involvement usually 
is not difficult to identify, whether the denial of a benefit or protection 
comes from a discriminatory or unfair discharge, a nonpayment of a wage, 
the allowance of discriminatory harassment, an unsafe work place, or a 
refusal to discharge a duty to bargain collectively.152 Any judicial 
determination of primary responsibility, in any event, can be obviated by 
 
 
“single employer” doctrine for determining collective bargaining responsibilities. See South Prairie 
Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). 
148 See infra text accompanying note 166. 
149 See infra text accompanying notes 167-175. 
150 See infra text accompanying notes 173-192. 
151 See infra text accompanying notes 193-204.  
152 Some British commentators have suggested solving the problem posed by “triangular” or 
multilateral employment relationships by assigning responsibility for particular benefits or protections 
to one of the involved enterprises based on its functional relationship with the worker. See, e.g., 
JEREMIAH PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER (2017); Deakin, supra note 41, 36 INDUS. L. 
J. at 80-81.     
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indemnification agreements between the employers, which always can be 
negotiated in contractual relationships. Assigning responsibility to both 
employers thus is most important in cases where the employer that seems 
to have the most direct involvement is insolvent. 
Assigning responsibility for protections or benefits associated with 
particular work to a second, less directly involved enterprise whose 
interests are aligned with this work provides a more meaningful limit on 
expanded responsibility than does relying on the “dependence” of the first 
employer on the second. Assigning responsibility for one directly involved 
employer’s employment law violations to a second employer because of 
the first employer’s economic “dependence” on the second, as suggested 
by some American courts applying an “economic realities” test,153 the 
Department of Labor in the Obama administration,154 and some 
commentators,155 could expand liability to totally independent businesses. 
Small businesses, such as restaurants, pharmacies, and barber shops, for 
instance, may be completely “dependent” on the continued proximate 
presence of a large manufacturing plant or office building. Clearly, the 
enterprise operating the plant or office building should not be responsible 
for the protection of one of the small business’s employees. 
To be sure, in the case of proximate small businesses dependent on the 
presence of large independent employers, there is not a contractual 
relationship between the small business and the large business on which 
assignment of primary responsibility and cost internalization could be 
based. Even when there is a contractual relationship between two fully 
independent businesses with somewhat opposed interests, however, the 
mere dependence of one on the other does not make a strong case for the 
assignment of responsibility to the second for the protection of the 
 
 
153 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir.  2008); Baker v. Flint 
Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998). 
154 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 
2016-1, JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND MIGRANT AND SEASON 
AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT 5, 13 (2016). 
155 See e.g., GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW, 1345-1349 (2016); 
Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS. 
REL. 727, 739 (2004). Economic dependence is generally an unhelpful concept for defining 
employment relationships. Workers with substantial trust funds can be employees of employers on 
whom they are not dependent. So can workers with special skills that would enable them to work for 
many employers if they were discharged by one. Even a worker without independent wealth or special 
skills who garners a living wage from each of two employers is dependent on neither, but is still an 
employee of both. And a worker assigned to many clients by an agency or a digital platform can be an 
employee of both the clients and the agency or platform. See infra text accompanying notes 167-172. 
The opposite of “independent” as a modifier of “contractor” should be “aligned in interest” rather than 
“dependent.” 
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employees of the first.  
Assume, for instance, that a manufacturer of specialized tubing sells a 
substantial majority of its tubing at a negotiated price to one pipeline 
manufacturer. Work at the tubing production plant benefits the pipeline 
manufacturer, and the pipeline’s manufacturer’s payments for the tubing 
influences the compensation of the tubing company’s employees. 
Nonetheless, the tubing work is performed under the direction and control 
of the tubing company’s managers aligned only with the tubing company’s 
interests. The tubing company’s management decides how much capital 
and what type is to be used in production. This management also decides 
how much and what quality of labor to employ and how that labor is to be 
motivated. These decisions are made in the ultimate interests of the tubing 
company, not in those of the pipeline manufacturer. The tubing company 
wants to satisfy the pipeline manufacturer at the lowest production costs 
possible. The manufacturer wants the best quality product possible at the 
price for which it has contracted. Even if the pipeline manufacturer limits 
the pay of the tubing company’s employees by what it pays for tubing, an 
alignment-of-interests analysis explains why the tubing manufacturer’s 
economic dependence on the pipeline manufacturer provides an 
insufficient basis for the pipeline manufacturer’s responsibility for the 
tubing manufacturer’s employees.156 
The alignment of interests test thus denies joint employer status based 
on mere economic dependence or dominance, but it also illuminates why 
such status is appropriate in the four situations noted above. The clearest 
case for joint employment is provided by the first of these situations, 
where one employer is paid for administering personnel policy for a 
second employer that directs the performance of work in its interests. 
However, this case has posed a difficult problem for U.K. law.  
The problem for U.K. law derived in part from conditioning 
employment status on the existence of a “contract of employment.” 
Workers supplied, compensated, and administered by an employment 
agency whose business is the provision of temporary workers do not have 
any actual contract with a client or user enterprise that directs their work in 
this client’s interest.157 The workers’ only formal contractual relationship 
is with the employment agency, which in turn is in privity with the client 
 
 
156 See, e.g., Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010) (produce merchant’s ability to 
leverage payments to farm producer could influence farm worker pay, but did not make merchant 
employer of farm workers whose work it did not direct or directly compensate).  
157 See Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships, supra note 
155, at 731-32. 
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or user enterprise. Thus, the suggestion in some British cases that 
temporary agency workers may have an implied contract of employment 
with the end user has not proven to be durable.158  
Some earlier decisions, moreover, had held an employment agency’s 
contract with its workers not to be a contract of employment159 because the 
agency had no obligation to provide, and the workers had no obligation to 
accept, further work.160 Though decisions now recognize as adequate the 
temporary worker’s contract with the agency during a single engagement 
with the user employer,161 these engagements are often too short to ensure 
coverage under statutes that require a qualifying period.162 Moreover, 
some decisions held that an employment agency in any event could not be 
an employer of workers who were not subject to its control at their work 
place.163 
The problem of having no responsible employer has been addressed 
under the Working Time Regulations and the National Minimum Wage 
Act by assigning a contractual obligation to the employer with the 
responsibility to compensate the workers in cases where a contract 
between the worker and one of the employers otherwise cannot be 
found.164 Like the limb (b) definition of worker, however, this does not 
cover some of the employment benefits and protections offered by U.K. 
law.165 Furthermore, no U.K. law or decisions seems to recognize 
 
 
158 Compare Dacas v. Brook St. Bureau (UK) Ltd. [2004] ICR 1437, [2004] IRLR 358 (CA) 
(Mummery, LJ) (dicta suggesting that dismissed agency cleaning worker might have had a claim 
against end user through an implied contract of serve), with Smith v. Carillion (JM) Ltd. [2015] 
EWCA (Civ) 209, [2015] IRLR 467 (CA) (Civ), and Alstom Transport v. Tilson [2010] EWCA (Civ) 
1308, [2011] IRLR 169 (CA) (Civ) (both rejecting a claim based on implied contract with end user of 
services).  
159 Temporary workers were described as working under contracts sui generis rather than under 
a contract of employment with either the supplier or user firm. See Constr. Indus. Training Bd. v. 
Labour Force Ltd. [1970] 3 All ER 220 (QBD). 
160 See, e.g., Wickens v. Champion Emp’t [1984] ICR 365 (EAT). See also Pertemps Grp. Plc v. 
Nixon [1993] EAT (UK), discussed in DEIRDRE MCCANN, REGULATING FLEXIBLE WORK 41 
(2008). 
161 See, e.g., McMeechan v. Sec’y of State for Emp’t [1997] IRLR 353, 357, 360. 
162 Most importantly, protections against unfair dismissal and for redundancy payments now 
require qualifying periods of two years. See Employment Rights Act 1996, c.18, § 108(1).  
163 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Johnson Underwood Ltd. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 318, [2001] ICR 
819, [2001] IRLR 269. 
164 See National Minimum Wage Act 1998 c. 39 § 34; The Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 
1998/1883, reg. 36. Depending upon its interpretation, the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 reg. 5, 
also may mitigate, but not solve, the problem. SI 2010/93. This regulation was issued to accord with 
the EU’s Temporary Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC), to ensure agency workers the right to 
equal treatment with the permanent work-force of the end user. See GWYNETH PITT, PITT’S 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 117-18 (10th ed. 2016). 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 64-70. 
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expressly that both an employment agency and an end user employer 
could be responsible for ensuring minimum benefits or protections.166  
In the United States, where an employment relationship can exist in the 
absence of a formal contractual relationship, there has been recognition 
that an end user can be a joint employer of employees supplied by a 
staffing agency that supplies and manages the benefits and compensation 
of employees in behalf of the end user.167 Thus, § 1.04(b) of the 
Restatement of Employment requires only that a jointly employed worker 
provide service to at least one of the employers, and that both employers 
each control or supervise the rendering of services in order to ensure the 
alignment required for employment status by § 1.01.168  
The alignment of interests condition is regularly met for both 
employers in the case of workers supplied and administered by temporary 
staffing agencies because the staffing agency is best served when the 
temporary employees provide the best service to the user employer. 
Effective service of the user employer will more likely result in a 
continuation of the compensated commercial relationship between the two 
employers that is in the interest of the staffing agency. This is equally true 
for staffing agencies that place employees through digital platforms.  
Note, however, that this confluence of interests between the staffing 
agency and the user employer may not exist if the staffing agency is paid 
only a fee for the provision of workers rather than for a continuing 
administration of their benefits or other personnel matters. While the 
goodwill of the staffing agency would be impaired by referring workers 
that provided ineffective service, a staffing agency that collects fees only 
for placement may not have the same investment in the continuing service 
of the employment of those it places. A staffing agency that collects only a 
placement fee, for instance, would gain no continuing benefit if a user 
employer extended a worker’s service after finding the worker particularly 
productive.    
A problematic British case illustrates the second type of joint 
employment alignment, where one employer generally controls both the 
work and compensation of the employees as a service to customers who 
 
 
166 However, under the Equality Act 2010 § 41, a client firm as a “principal” may not 
discriminate against a temporary worker under contract with an agency in cases where an employer 
may not discriminate against an employee. Equality Act 2010 c. 15. See, e.g., Abbey Life Assurance v. 
Tansell [2000] EWCA (Civ) 107, [2000] IRLR 387 (EAT). See also Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 c. 37, § 3 (requiring employers to ensure as far as reasonably practicable that non-employees are 
not exposed to risks to their health and safety).   
167 See, e.g., Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir. 2008). 
168 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 1.01, 1.04(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
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ultimately pay the compensation and have discretion to direct the service 
in alignment with their interests. In Cheng Yuen v. Royal Hong Kong 
Club,169 a golf club trained, disciplined, assigned, and compensated 
caddies who assisted the club’s members during their golfing rounds. The 
club debited the members at a set fee for the caddies’ services. The 
caddies’ responsive services thus were aligned with the interests both of 
the club and of the members, although the Privy Council, denying an 
option of joint employment, viewed the members as the caddies’ only 
employers.170   
In some cases the clients of digital platforms might be joint employers 
along with the platforms of workers assigned by the platforms. This is 
probably not the case for Uber’s passengers. Because Uber controls its 
drivers’ routes, vehicles, and fares, 171 Uber passengers cannot ensure their 
drivers’ direct service of their interests, as might the golfers in Cheng 
Yeun. However, clients of a platform that takes a percentage commission, 
but allows the clients some discretion to control the work and negotiate a 
fee, are similar to the golfers.  
Neither the Aslam tribunal nor other tribunals have been asked to find a 
joint employment relationship in cases involving platforms because no one 
has claimed the clients to be employers. The lack of such claims is not 
surprising for several reasons, including the absence of continuing service 
to particular clients. That absence of continuity presents a legal hurdle for 
liability under employment laws in the U.K.172 and a logistical hurdle for 
employment laws in the U.S.173  
 The third type of continuing joint employer relationship based on 
aligned interests, where one employer is compensated by a second 
employer for ensuring that work serves the interests of the second 
employer, has posed particular problems even for American legal doctrine 
that recognizes the possibility of joint employment. The problems have 
become more salient as what Hugh Collins almost three decades ago 
 
 
169 Yuen v. Royal Hong Kong Golf Club [1998] ICR 131 (PC).  
170 For a criticism of the decision and an argument that both the club and the members were 
employers, see Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, Labour Markets, Welfare, and the Personal Scope of 
Employment Law, 16 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 84, 92-93 (2000). For a more recent similar case, 
see Stringfellow Restaurants Ltd. v. Quashie, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1735, [2013] IRLR 99 (CA) (lap 
dancers jointly employed by club as well as by club’s clients). 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 126-128. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.  
173 Collective bargaining, for instance, cannot be practical or meaningful with a series of short 
term joint employers, nor is it feasible to enforce wage, overtime, or leave regulations against such 
employers. On the other hand, the enforcement of health and safety regulations or anti-discrimination 
prohibitions against a short term client-employer might be appropriate and feasible in some cases.  
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termed the “vertical disintegration” of modern capitalist economic 
production systems has proceeded apace.174  
The most important aspect of this disintegration, more recently and 
famously termed “fissuring” by David Weil,175 the last Administrator of 
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department Secretary of Labor during 
the Obama administration, is not the formal conversion of individual 
employees into independent contractors, but rather the increased division 
of operational responsibilities through out-sourcing or subcontracting. 
Much of this increased fissuring has been driven by financial calculations 
that more specialized businesses concentrating on what are called “core 
competencies” can be more efficient.176 Much of it also has resulted from 
labor cost savings that derive from subcontractors being able to use lower 
compensated workers from secondary labor markets not as available for 
central businesses that require a more permanent, skilled, and highly 
compensated internal labor market where workers are attuned to horizontal 
equity in wages.177 Some of it, however, may derive from secondary labor 
market contractors being less concerned with the reputational costs of non-
compliance with employment laws.178 
Applying an alignment of interests test does not impose joint employer 
business status on all central business operations benefitted by 
subcontracting. Even a subcontractor attractive to a central business 
because of lower labor costs partially based on reduced compliance with 
employment statutes may control its workers to advance interests not fully 
aligned with those of the central business. Consider, for instance, the usual 
subcontracting of cleaning services for hospitals, office buildings, 
commercial stores, and manufacturing plants. Cleaning subcontractors 
chosen because of their low labor costs, even if in part associated with 
noncompliance with employment laws, may be free to assign and direct 
their employees and allocate their limited capital in their own interest of 
doing satisfactory work at the lowest cost. The somewhat misaligned 
 
 
174 See Collins, supra note 101, at 354. 
175 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 7 (Harvard Univ. Press 2014). 
176 See, e.g., id. at 49-52; Collins, supra note 101, at 356-58.  
177 See, e.g., id. at 360; WEIL, supra note 175, at 85-88; Davidov, Joint Employer Status in 
Triangular Employment Relationships, supra note 155, at 730-31. 
178 See Minwoong Ji & David Weil, The Impact of Franchising on Labor Standards 
Compliance, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 977 (2015) (finding far higher levels of noncompliance 
with minimum wage and overtime standards in franchised outlets than in comparable franchisor-
owned outlets in fast food industries). The authors conclude that their data “suggests the importance of 
brand reputation as an explanation of the overall differences in compliance behavior” because 
franchisees are less concerned with the general impact of noncompliance on brand reputation. Id. at 
1003.  
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interests of the office buildings are to receive the highest quality service 
possible, not just satisfactory service, at the contracted for price.   
In some cases, however, a central business hires subcontractors to 
reduce labor costs without allowing the work they supply to deviate from 
alignment with the interests of the central business. These subcontracts 
produce a joint employer relationship. Consider the stated facts of the 
controversial 2015 Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (BFI) 
case, upon which a Labor Board appointed by President Obama based a 
finding of joint employment.179 BFI operated a recycling facility for the 
sorting of materials into separate commodities to be sold to other 
businesses. BFI directly employed around the facility some managers, 
supervisors, and skilled specialists, including union-represented operators 
of heavy equipment.180 The main operation inside the facility consisted of 
several conveyor belts, from which passing material was sorted by 
relatively unskilled workers standing on platforms.181 The sorters were 
supplied by a subcontractor, which processed their compensation and 
provided direct supervision of their work. The subcontractor also supplied, 
compensated, and directly supervised other relatively unskilled workers 
who cleared jams and cleaned the sorters and the rest of the facility.182 The 
recycling business reimbursed the subcontractor for the subcontractors’ 
workers compensation, adding a percentage mark-up pursuant to what was 
essentially a cost plus contract.183 The subcontractor could set 
compensation levels, as long as they were below the pay range set by the 
 
 
179 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. 186 (2015). The Board’s decision in the case 
provoked an outcry in the business community, leading to the introduction of legislation to state a 
different standard for joint employment that would depart from the common law. Save Local Business 
Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong., (2017). The BFI decision unremarkably formulated a standard for joint 
employment that required each employer to satisfy the common law standard for employment, but the 
decision also rejected language in recent Board decisions that required a joint employer’s control over 
employees to be exercised “directly” and “immediately” and not in a “limited and routine” manner. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. at 15-16. Even though arguably not necessary to the 
decision in BFI, the Board, perhaps with insufficient elaboration, held that a user employer’s control 
could be sufficient for joint employment even if only exercised indirectly through controlled 
supervisors of a subcontractor, as long as the control was sufficient “within the meaning of the 
common law” and if the employers “share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms 
and conditions of employment.” Id. at 15.  
The BFI decision was overruled by a reconstituted Board appointed by President Trump. See Hy-
Brand Indus. Contractors Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017). But the Hy-Brand decision and 
the overruling of BFI were vacated two months later because of a determination that one of the new 
Board members should have been disqualified to rule in the case. See 366 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Feb. 26, 
2018).  
180 362 N.L.R.B. at 2. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 3-4. 
183 Id. at 4. 
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recycler for its own directly employed workers.184 The recycler, however, 
could terminate the subcontract, including for excessive cost, with thirty 
days of notice.185 The recycling business’s management retained and used 
authority to reject any of the workers supplied by the subcontractor and to 
initiate discipline of any of these workers.186 The recycling management 
controlled the pace and hours of work by setting the operation, breaks, and 
speed of the conveyor belts.187 It also determined where the sorters and 
other supplied workers were to work and monitored their work hours to 
ensure they were not overstated.188 Furthermore, the recycler’s supervisors 
determined daily operational plans and directed the subcontracting 
supervisors.189 In addition to giving instructions to the subcontractor’s 
employees indirectly through the subcontractor’s supervisors, the 
recycler’s supervisors retained and sometimes used authority to issue 
direct instructions to the subcontractor-supplied workers, even when those 
instructions countermanded directions from the subcontractor’s 
supervisors.190  
This scenario presents an example of joint employment under interest 
alignment analysis. Through its discretion to terminate the cost–plus 
subcontract, the recycling company was able to ensure that the 
subcontractor’s workers were paid as it wished. Furthermore, by 
overseeing the supervisors of the subcontractor’s workers at the recycler’s 
plant, as well as by directly controlling the pacing and timing of work, and 
of the subcontractor’s workers, the recycler’s management could ensure 
that the workers’ service was directly aligned with the interests of the 
recycler.   
The Board in BFI did not suggest that the relationship between the 
recycler and the subcontractor was that of a single integrated employer. 
The subcontractor was not under the general control of the recycler; it 
presumably operated its central administrative offices independently and 
serviced other clients as a provider and supervisor of work. The particular 
work at the recycler’s plant, however, was under the ultimate control of 
the recycler. The recycler had sufficient control to ensure that these 
workers did not generate returns for the subcontractor at its expense rather 
than for its benefit. The workers efforts were fully aligned with the 
 
 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 3. 
186 Id. at 3-4. 
187 Id. at 4-5. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 5. 
190 Id.  
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interests of the recycler. Thus, the recycler was a joint employer and 
should be subject to both vicarious liability for the torts of the 
subcontractor’s employees and responsibility to ensure that these 
employees receive the guarantees of employment protection and benefit 
statutes.   
Given the mandate from Congress to use a common law test for 
defining the employment relationship,191 the Board in BFI understandably 
at least purported to apply a joint employer standard based on the common 
law.192 The common law provides the Board with a cloak of legitimacy, 
just as it has provided such a cloak for the Supreme Court.193 But because 
the common law standard remains murky and undefined by an ultimate 
policy justification, the Board’s standard is less clear and more vulnerable 
to criticism. Used as explanation and justification, the alignment analysis 
suggested by the common law insight provided by the law of respondeat 
superior could provide a firmer foundation for joint employer findings in 
cases like BFI. 
Alignment analysis also would supply a firmer foundation for finding 
joint employment relationships in the fourth type of case where they may 
exist, where the second employer otherwise has sufficient control over the 
first employer to ensure that the work is aligned with interests of the first 
employer that do not conflict with interests of its own. This type of case is 
similar to the third type, but it differs because the second employer’s 
control over the first employer may not be limited to authority secured by 
contract to issue directions to the first employer to provide and manage 
workers in the second employer’s behalf. The control may derive from a 
more complicated economic relationship between the two employers.  
The paradigm case is the relationship between some brand franchisors 
and some franchisee businesses. Treating individual workers as 
franchisees may be a sham to avoid employment status.194 True 
franchisees, by contrast, contribute significant capital that they have some 
discretion to control in their own interests, independent of those of their 
franchisors. Indeed, franchising presumably has proliferated and been 
successful because it enlists franchises to raise capital quickly for 
expansion195 while also providing incentives – probably greater than those 
 
 
191 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
192 See discussion, supra note 179. 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. 
194 See, e.g., Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass. 2010) (cleaning 
company denominated its cleaning workers as franchisees; misclassification under Massachusetts law).  
195 See JEFFREY L. BRADACH, FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS 75 (1998); JOHN F. LOVE, 
MCDONALD’S: BEHIND THE ARCHES 202 (1986). Some studies indicate that businesses facing 
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for managers in a large business hierarchy – for the franchisees to sell the 
franchisor’s brand.196   
Franchisor control over the operations of franchisees varies across a 
broad spectrum. The grant of a franchise may be little more than the 
authorization of the use of a trademark for purposes of product 
distribution, without any restriction on the franchisee’s control of its 
methods of operation.197 Even franchisors that demand franchisees adopt a 
particular business format and maintain specific brand quality may cede 
some discretion to their franchisees to make certain operational decisions, 
at least subject to a right of review. Such operational discretion may cover 
advertising, building maintenance and decoration, and some supply 
contracts.198  The ceded discretion also may include control over the 
franchisees’ workers, including their hiring, firing, discipline, 
compensation, staffing assignments, and working hours. 
Franchise agreements that allow franchisees to maintain control over 
the identity, compensation, and allocation of their workers do not establish 
joint employment, because such agreements do not fully align the duties of 
the franchisees’ employees with the interests of the franchisors as well as 
those of the franchisees. The franchisees’ interests may conflict in part 
with the interests of their franchisor because the typical franchise 
agreement requires the franchisee to pay royalties calculated as a 
percentage of revenues, in addition to an initial investment and the rental 
of any franchisor property used by the franchisee.199 Higher profit margins 
that derive from cost-cutting labor allocation decisions thus benefit the 
franchisee, while somewhat different labor allocation decisions that might 
enhance service could result in increased sales that would provide benefit 
 
 
capital constraints are more likely to rely on franchising. See James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen, Jr., 
Can Capital Scarcity Help Agency Theory Explain Franchising? Revisiting the Capital Scarcity 
Hypothesis, 42 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 196 (1999); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and The 
Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J. OF LAW & ECON. 223, 232-33 (1978). 
196 Franchising thus is a response to the “agency problem” confronted by firms. See James A. 
Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. OF 
FIN. ECON. 401 (1987); G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise 
Contracts, 28 J. OF LAW & ECON. 503 (1985). See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF 
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  
197 This form of franchising may be termed “trademark franchising.” See, e.g., Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 927, 933 (1990). 
198 See, e.g., the wide variation in the franchisor-franchisee contracts reviewed in Hadfield, 
supra note 197, at 940-43. 
199 See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 196; Hadfield, supra note 197, at 935-36. See 
generally ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).  
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to the franchisor.200 Furthermore, a franchisor can maintain control of its 
brand reputation by maintaining control over the content and presentation 
of its branded product without aligning a franchisee’s capital and labor 
allocation decisions with its interests.201  
The hopes of franchisees to maintain, or expand, profitable franchisee 
operations, however, are dependent upon staying in the good graces of 
their franchisor.202 The generally dominant economic and legal position of 
the franchisor thus provides the potential for the franchisor to control 
franchisee decisions relevant to the alignment of workers’ duties and 
efforts. A franchisor could exercise its dominant economic position to 
induce a franchisee to control its employees to serve the franchisee in a 
manner that fully aligns with the interests of the franchisor. Though a 
franchisor’s mere potential dominance over a franchisee should not suffice 
to establish joint employment, it does warrant consideration of whether the 
franchisor has been coordinating the franchisees’ control over its 
employees to align with its interests.  That coordination could be 
demonstrated, for instance, by evidence that a franchisor required its 
franchisees to accept overall employment policies set in software provided 
by the franchisor,203 -software that presumptively would not direct 
franchisees against the franchisor’s own interest.204  
 
 
200 There is some evidence that wages at franchisee outlets are lower than those at company-
owned and managed outlets. See Alan B. Krueger, Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination of 
Franchising in the Fast Foods Industry, 106 Q. J. OF ECON. 75 (1991). See also Roger D. Blair & 
David L. Kaserman, A Note on Incentive Incompatibility Under Franchising, 9 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 
323 (1987); John M. Barron & John R. Umbeck, The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: 
The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets, 27 J. OF LAW & ECON. 313 (1984).  
201 See NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel Advice Memorandum on Nutritionality, Inc. Cases 
13-CA-134294 et al. (Apr. 28, 2015) (“Freshii’s requirements regarding food preparation, recipes, 
menu, uniforms, décor, store hours, and initial employee training prior to a franchise opening are not 
evidence of control over … labor relations but rather establish Freshii’s legitimate interest in 
protecting the quality of its product and brand.”). 
202 See, e.g., Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing  
declaration of John A. Gordon, restaurant advisor and consultant: “‘McDonald’s is able to exercise a 
greater degree of control over its franchisees’ restaurants . . . through control over growth and rewrite, 
and the ability to terminate franchise agreements for deviation from its standards.”).  
Franchisors typically make no future commitments concerning maintenance or expansion in their 
agreements with franchisees. See Hadfield, supra note 197, at 944.  
203 Many franchisors now provide such software, though its use may be optional. See Ochoa v. 
McDonald’s, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1237 (McDonald’s “In-Store Processor” has “optional functions, like 
timekeeping, crew scheduling, inventory, and positioning”).   
204 Cf. Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (the “Proposed Defendants 
[franchisor] promulgated compensation policies and implemented them through the Domino’s PULSE 
system which was used at the defendants’ store and included a system of tracking hours and wages and 
retaining payroll records which was submitted to the Proposed Defendant for … review.”) 
In 2015 the General Counsel of the NLRB filed a series of complaints against McDonald’s, 
charging the major fast food franchisor with responsibility as a joint employer for a number of unfair 
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Establishing a franchisor’s control over a franchisee’s workers, no 
more than establishing a contractor’s control over the alignment of the 
work of a subcontractor’s employees or a user employer’s control over a 
temporary agency’s employees, does not establish a single employer 
relationship. A franchisor is primarily interested in enhancing the 
reputation and aggregate sales of its branded products, while the 
franchisee cares about the profits of its owned outlets and less about the 
general reputation of the brand.205 Thus, to the extent a franchisee’s 
ownership and management may make independent decisions about the 
deployment of their capital to enhance and market their particular 
franchise, they will not do so in full alignment with the interests of their 
franchisor. Nevertheless, with sufficient franchisor control over a 
franchisee’s employees’ work, a joint employment relationship can exist 
in a franchising relationship without the franchise being part of the 
franchisor’s single operations.  
 
 
VII. DEPARTURE FROM THE DEFAULT RULES FOR MULTIPLE EMPLOYER 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Accepting the trans-Atlantic applicability of interest alignment analysis 
as a default standard does not mean that it should never be qualified or 
modified for administrative convenience or to serve the purposes of a 
particular statute. For instance, it may be administratively difficult to 
protect some casual or part time work needful of employment protections 
and benefits. Difficulties may arise when work, whether or not located 
through an online intermediary, involves service rendered independently 
to individual customers or clients outside the control of an assigning 
employer. As effectively recognized in the limb (b) section in the 
 
 
labor practices alleged against some of its franchisees. The General Counsel’s case, as presented 
before an administrative law judge, was based in part on evidence that McDonald’s encourages its 
franchisees to use McDonald’s sophisticated software to reduce labor costs by determining the 
operational placement, compensation, and working times of the franchisees’ employees. The General 
Counsel’s evidence may have suggested that McDonald’s encouragement of the use includes effective 
conditioning of franchise renewal and expansion on the franchisee’s acceptance of directions given by 
the software. Whether or not the General Counsel’s evidence was sufficient to make the case that 
McDonald’s exerts effective control over franchisee employees to align their work closely with 
negotiated franchisor-franchisee interests, it is not difficult to imagine such effective control being 
imposed through modern technology. See Tomassetti, supra note 129, at 63-66. McDonald’s 
responsibilities for at least some of the alleged unfair labor practices need not have turned on a finding 
of its joint employer status, however.  See infra text accompanying note 210.  
205 See Hadfield, supra note 197, at 949-50. 
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definition of worker in the U.K. statutes,206 the only responsible employers 
for such work could be the customers or clients served. In many instances, 
however, a casual worker, like a yard worker or house cleaner, without 
control of significant capital, may not have a sufficient relationship with 
such customers or clients to make enforcement of employment laws 
against them practical or even desirable. The work often is performed for a 
private customer’s ultimate consumption rather than to further production 
of an enterprise, and it is often for periods too short to trigger statutory 
employee benefits or protections. In order to provide equal social 
protection, the state may have to provide supplementary benefits, such as 
unemployment or other supplementary compensation and vacation pay, for 
sporadic part time work for the consumption of householders or other 
customers, without attempting to assign responsibility to a series of 
employers with aligned interests.  
Furthermore, if some other manageable boundaries can be set, a 
developed economy like those of the U.S. and U.K. may wish to provide 
supplementary benefits even for some work outside the boundaries set for 
employment by alignment analysis. For instance, to achieve egalitarian 
distributive goals we may wish to offer supplementary benefits to 
independent yard workers or house cleaners without capital to allocate, but 
who are not employees of the householders they serve because they can 
use other workers as assistants and can adjust the timing of their work. We 
also may wish to offer supplementary social benefits to workers with 
limited capital such as an automobile, which they are free to use in their 
own interests at their own fares and routes, and without any direction from 
any assignment platform.  
There have been analogous recent expansions of respondeat superior 
vicarious liability in special circumstances based on strong policy 
rationales. For instance, courts have found employers to be vicariously 
liable for their agents’ sexual misconduct outside the scope of employment 
where the agents have used special power afforded by their positions over 
the vulnerable injured third parties. Thus, employers have been found 
vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of police officers, therapists, 
and nurses.207 Interpreting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,208 the 
 
 
206 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
207 See, e.g., Primeaux v. United States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1462-63 (8th Cir. 1996) (police officer’s 
sexual assault of stranded motorist); Plummer v. Ctr. Psychiatrists, Ltd. 476 S.E. 2d 172, 174-75 (Va. 
1996) (therapist’s sexual abuse of patient); Samuels v. S. Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 573 (La. Ct. 
App. 1992) (nursing assistant’s rape of patient). But see, e.g., Graham v. McGrath, 363 F. Supp. 2d 
1030, 1033-34 (S.D. Ill. 2005) (priest’s sexual abuse of young parishioner was not within scope of 
employment); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1989) (school district 
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United States Supreme Court also has crafted vicarious liability doctrine, 
qualified by an affirmative defense, to impose liability on employers for 
supervisors’ discriminatory harassment of subordinate employees, even 
though such harassment is outside the scope of employment.209 These 
expansions of vicarious liability doctrine can be supported by an argument 
that the employers benefited from the delegation of authority used by the 
tortfeasing agents, even if not from the course of conduct in which the 
torts were committed.  
 In some contexts we might expand responsibility beyond the 
boundaries set by the symmetrical cost internalization principle that 
underlies respondeat superior for four additional reasons. First, and most 
obviously, we may wish to apply anti-discrimination prohibitions to 
commercial relationships with independent contractors as well as to 
employment relationships with workers who do not have discretion to 
operate independent businesses. American law, for instance, prohibits race 
discrimination in all contracts.210  
More generally, any statutory provisions that do not merely require the 
provision of benefits, but also proscribe particular affirmative conduct, 
might be applied not only against joint employers with interests aligned 
with the work of the employee victims, but also against other entities that 
have some indirect culpability for the prohibited conduct. The culpability 
may derive from their encouragement or facilitation of the discriminatory 
or other prohibited conduct. This liability would be better characterized as 
analogous to direct rather than vicarious liability because it is based on the 
fault of the facilitating employer rather than on its responsibilities to 
protect its employees. For instance, a franchisor or a contractor that 
insisted or even advised that certain of its franchisee’s or subcontractor’s 
employees be discharged because of their union involvement should be 
guilty of an unfair labor practice under the NLRA regardless of whether or 
not it is a joint employer of the discharged workers.211   
 
 
not liable for teacher’s sexual assault of student). For an analysis of the same issue in British law, see 
Paula Giliker, Rough Justice in an Unjust World, 65 MOD. L. REV. 269 (2002). 
208 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2018). 
209 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 777, 807-808 (1998). 
210 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018). See, e.g., Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
211 The Labor Board has held in a series of cases that without being deemed a joint employer for 
purposes of collective bargaining obligations, an employer covered by the Act can be held liable for 
unfair labor practices against employees of another employer if the employer “involved itself directly 
in the employment decision at issue by directing, instructing, or ordering another employer to take an 
unlawfully motivated action against its employees.” Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 285, 
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Third, arguments based on efficiency and distributive justice that have 
supported respondeat superior liability,212 as qualified by considerations 
of reciprocal cost internalization, might be used with less qualification to 
expand the employers responsible for the denial of benefits promised by 
particular employment statutes. Thus, some concerned with the thin 
capitalization and potential insolvency of certain employers have argued 
that any entity in a distributional or supply chain should have secondary 
responsibility for ensuring wages required by the FLSA proportionate to 
its use of the inadequately compensated work.213 Indemnification clauses 
could ensure the assignment of primary responsibility as there would 
always be contractual relationships up and down supply and distributional 
chains.214 Even with the insulation of such clauses, however, large 
companies at the center of supply chains would have incentives to protect 
their brands through monitoring of smaller companies in the chain, and 
public authorities could use this monitoring for more efficient 
enforcement.215  
 
 
287 (1997). See also Dews Constr. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 182, 183 (1977); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 221 
N.L.R.B. 982 (1975). For a proposal that the Board impose liability on employers covered by the 
NLRA for unfair labor practices committed by other employers with whom they are in a close 
contractual relationship whenever the first employers knew or should have known of the unlawful 
actions and facilitated or failed to resist their commission, see Caroline Galiatsos, Beyond Joint 
Employer Status: A New Analysis for Employers’ Unfair Labor Practice Liability Under the NLRA, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 2083 (2015).    
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supply chains). 
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Fourth, I have argued elsewhere that the American law governing 
collective bargaining should provide workers who choose collective 
representation the right to bargain collectively with commercial entities 
that own and derive profit from the capital that the workers directly help 
make productive.216 I argued that workers should be able to attempt to 
share in any rent that the owners of the capital have been able to extract. 
This principle would not expand collective bargaining rights to employees 
of businesses up and down supply and distributional chains,217 but it would 
empower employees of certain subcontractors that work on the capital of 
other employers, even those beyond the default boundaries set by 
alignment analysis. The capital made productive might include intellectual 
property, including the brand name of franchisors. If this view were 
adopted, franchisees could become joint employers for purposes of 
collective bargaining, even if not for other employment law. 
CONCLUDING WORDS 
Arguments for expanding or contracting the range of enterprises that 
have potential legal responsibilities under various employment laws based 
on the purposes of the laws do not necessarily obviate the need for general 
default definitions of employers and employees and their consequent 
employment relationships. Such default definitions may provide beneficial 
clarity and coherence if they can be derived from a sufficiently compelling 
general principle or standard. This essay attempts to elaborate and apply 
such a principle based on an insight derived from the Anglo-American 
common law of vicarious liability.  
Whether the elaborated principle is compelling should turn not on 
whether it reflects formal categories derived from the language of the 
common law. Rather, the principle’s utility as a default standard should 
turn on whether it provides proper incentives and a “just” and 
administratively feasible assignment of responsibility for worker 
protection and benefits.  
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